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Federalism, the Rehnquist Court, 
and the Modern Republican Party 
 
ver the past two years, assessments of the Rehnquist 
Court’s legacy have covered a broad range of topics, from 
civil rights to criminal procedure to the role of the Supreme 
Court itself.1  A subject rarely missed, however, is federalism, 
which many commentators have called the centerpiece of the 
Rehnquist Court’s constitutional agenda.2  During William 
Rehnquist’s tenure as Chief Justice, the Court reinvigorated a 
range of structural constraints on the national government, 
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1 See, e.g., Symposium, Looking Backward, Looking Forward: The Legacy of 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1661 (2006); 
Symposium, The Rehnquist Court in Empirical and Statistical Retrospective, 24 
CONST. COMMENT. 3 (2007); Lori A. Ringhand, The Rehnquist Court: A “By the 
Numbers” Retrospective, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1033 (2007); A Symposium on the 
Legacy of the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 869 (2006). 
2 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Libertarian-Lite Constitutional Order and the 
Rehnquist Court, 93 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1047 (2005) (book review) (calling the 
Rehnquist Court’s high-profile federalism decisions “the cases for which the 
Rehnquist Court will be remembered”); M. Elizabeth Magill, The Revolution that 
Wasn’t, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 47, 47 (2004) (“A principal legacy of the Rehnquist 
Court is its revitalization of doctrines associated with federalism.”). 
O 
JOONDEPH.FMT 12/8/2008  10:58:27 AM 
118 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87, 117 
invalidating numerous federal statutes on the ground that they 
exceeded Congress’s enumerated powers.3  Though the ultimate 
significance of these decisions remains unclear,4 one point is 
undisputed: under Rehnquist’s stewardship, the Supreme Court 
revived the salience of federalism as a principle of constitutional 
law. 
Though several scholars have offered insightful evaluations of 
the Rehnquist Court’s federalism jurisprudence, these 
assessments have tended to overlook an important aspect of the 
story.  Specifically, by focusing almost exclusively on the Court’s 
decisions addressing the structural limits on Congress’s powers, 
scholars have largely ignored those disputes involving 
federalism-based constraints on the states.5  The most significant 
 
3 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating the civil 
remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act as beyond Congress’s 
powers under the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 
(1997) (invalidating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as beyond Congress’s 
Section 5 power); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act 
as beyond Congress’s commerce power); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 
(1992). 
4 See, e.g., Ann Althouse, Inside the Federalism Cases: Concern About the Federal 
Courts, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 132, 142 (2001); Douglas 
Laycock, Protecting Liberty in a Federal System: The US Experience, in PATTERNS 
OF REGIONALISM AND FEDERALISM 119, 140 (Jörg Fedtke & Basil S. Markesinis 
eds., 2006); Jim Chen, Filburn’s Forgotten Footnote–Of Farm Team Federalism and 
Its Fate, 82 MINN. L. REV. 249, 254 (1997); Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, Who’s 
Afraid of the Eleventh Amendment? The Limited Impact of the Court’s Sovereign 
Immunity Rulings, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 213 (2006); Frank B. Cross, Realism About 
Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304, 1321 (1999) (“Scrutiny of the recent decisions 
reveals them to be largely symbolic bows to a federalism myth rather than real 
limitations on federal power.”); Ernest A. Young, Is the Sky Falling on the Federal 
Government? State Sovereign Immunity, the Section Five Power, and the Federal 
Balance, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1551 (2003) (book review). 
5 Of course, there are some notable exceptions.  See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Empowering States When It Matters: A Different Approach to Preemption, 69 
BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1313–14 (2004); Cross, supra note 4, at 1310–11; Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 431–33 (2002); Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, 
Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment, 14 SUP. 
CT. ECON. REV. 43, 44 (2006); Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, 
Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353 (2006); Seth F. Kreimer, 
Federalism and Freedom, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 66, 68 (2001); 
Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 436 
(2002); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. 
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of these constraints are the dormant Commerce Clause and the 
doctrine of preemption.  The dormant Commerce Clause 
prohibits state laws (absent congressional authorization) that 
discriminate against, or impose an undue burden on, interstate 
commerce.  And the doctrine of preemption, derived from the 
Supremacy Clause, dictates that federal law shall negate any 
state law with which it conflicts, either expressly or implicitly.  
Together these doctrines largely define the states’ constitutional 
authority to regulate in those areas in which both the federal 
government and the states enjoy legislative jurisdiction.  And 
because most human activity in the United States remains 
regulable by both the federal government and the states, these 
doctrines are critical to the states’ policy-making autonomy. 
Given the Rehnquist Court’s rather aggressive efforts to 
enhance state autonomy in its decisions construing the 
Commerce Clause, the Tenth Amendment, the Eleventh 
Amendment, and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment–
decisions like United States v. Lopez,6 United States v. Morrison,7 
and Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett8–
one might reasonably have expected the Justices to pursue a 
similar course with respect to preemption and the dormant 
Commerce Clause.  But they did not.  A careful examination of 
the Rehnquist Court’s record in the full range of federalism 
decisions shows that the five Justices most responsible for the 
Court’s “federalism offensive”–Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, 
Kennedy, and Thomas–were largely indifferent to state policy-
making autonomy in cases involving preemption and the 
dormant Commerce Clause.  If anything, these Justices actually 
pushed the law in the opposite direction, increasing the 
likelihood that state initiatives would be preempted or 
invalidated on dormant Commerce Clause grounds. 
In this Article, I make two empirical claims about the 
Rehnquist Court’s federalism jurisprudence, one descriptive and 
one interpretive.  The descriptive claim is that the Court’s 
overall approach to federalism was more complicated than many 
 
REV. 343, 362–78; Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 
TEX. L. REV. 1, 130–34 (2004). 
6 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
7 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
8 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
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have assumed, and it was not necessarily friendly to the states.  
To support this contention, I present an empirical study.  Part of 
the study is qualitative, analyzing the Justices’ modest doctrinal 
moves with respect to preemption and the dormant Commerce 
Clause during Rehnquist’s tenure as Chief Justice.  The other 
part is quantitative, offering a statistical analysis of the Justices’ 
voting patterns in decisions handed down between October 1991 
and June 2005, the fifteen terms that Rehnquist, O’Connor, 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas served together.  Both aspects of 
the study underscore a basic point.  In cases addressing the 
margins of Congress’s power–where the choice was between 
congressional authority and state autonomy–these five Justices 
consistently voted for the outcome that enhanced state 
autonomy.  But in cases that were inframarginal, addressing 
matters plainly within Congress’s regulatory authority–where 
the choice was between greater state autonomy and less 
regulation–these Justices tended to vote for the outcome that 
reduced government regulation. 
My interpretive claim is that these apparently inconsistent 
attitudes toward state autonomy are actually quite 
understandable once one considers the broader historical and 
political context.  In fine, the Rehnquist Court’s federalism 
decisions reflected the values of the modern Republican Party, 
the political coalition that empowered and sustained a majority 
of the Court’s Justices.  The modern GOP has generally 
endorsed the abstract principle of devolving greater power to 
state governments and particularly the judicial enforcement of 
the limits on Congress’s enumerated powers.  But when the 
principle of state policy-making autonomy has clashed with the 
goal of reducing economic regulation, Republicans have 
repeatedly opted to reduce regulation at the expense of state 
authority.  The Rehnquist Court largely mirrored these 
priorities.  In the full run of federalism decisions, the Justices 
tended to prefer results that curtailed regulation, even when 
those outcomes diminished the autonomy of state governments. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  In Part I, I briefly 
summarize the Rehnquist Court’s federalism offensive.  I suggest 
that those aspects of its federalism jurisprudence that have been 
largely overlooked–namely, those addressing the structural 
limits on state governments–may actually be more important to 
the states’ real-world policy-making autonomy than the high-
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profile decisions on which the Rehnquist Court’s reputation is 
based.  In Part II, I present an empirical study of the Rehnquist 
Court’s federalism decisions.  I demonstrate that the Justices’ 
concern for state autonomy differed markedly depending on 
whether the constitutional provision at issue constrained 
Congress or the states.  Finally, in Part III, I suggest that this 
apparent tension in the Court’s jurisprudence is eminently 
understandable given the broader political forces at work: it 
reflected the priorities of the modern GOP, the political 
movement responsible for the Rehnquist Court’s creation and 
sustenance. 
I 
THE REHNQUIST COURT’S FEDERALISM OFFENSIVE AND THE 
LIMITS OF ITS DOMAIN 
As many other commentators have discussed, the Rehnquist 
Court reshaped the doctrine of constitutional federalism.9  It 
articulated a new and arguably narrower standard for evaluating 
whether a federal statute falls within Congress’s commerce 
 
9 The thoughtful and perceptive commentary on the Rehnquist Court’s 
federalism jurisprudence is far too voluminous to cite in its entirety.  See, e.g., 
LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 230 (2004); JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE 
NATION’S POWER (2002); MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED (2005); Jack M. 
Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. 
REV. 1045 (2001); Evan H. Caminker, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on 
Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127 (2001); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, 
Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2001); Fallon, supra note 5; David L. 
Franklin, Facial Challenges, Legislative Purpose, and the Commerce Clause, 92 
IOWA L. REV. 41 (2006); Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the 
Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 
YALE L.J. 1707 (2002); Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 5; Pamela S. Karlan, The 
Irony of Immunity: The Eleventh Amendment, Irreparable Injury, and Section 1983, 
53 STAN. L. REV. 1311 (2001); Meltzer, supra note 5; Thomas W. Merrill, The 
Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 569 (2003); J. Mitchell Pickerill & Cornell W. Clayton, The Rehnquist Court 
and the Political Dynamics of Federalism, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 233 (2004); Robert C. 
Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: 
Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 
(2003); Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and 
Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554 (1995); Robert 
A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243 
(2005); Keith E. Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the Court’s 
Federalism Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477 (2001); Young, supra note 5. 
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power.10  It developed a restrictive understanding of Congress’s 
legislative authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, requiring that such legislation be “congruent and 
proportional” to the constitutional violations that Congress 
seeks to remedy or prevent.11  It created the so-called 
“anticommandeering” principle, which prohibits Congress from 
directing the states to enact or implement regulation according 
to federal instructions.12  It held that Congress cannot use 
legislation enacted under Article I to subject the states to 
private, unconsenting suits for damages,13 overruling the 
relatively recent precedent of Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.14  
And it extended this principle of sovereign immunity to suits 
brought in any court, whether state or federal,15 as well as to 
adjudicative proceedings before federal administrative 
agencies.16 
In addition to these constitutional rulings, the Rehnquist 
Court frequently invoked federalism principles in interpreting 
federal statutes so as to minimize the encroachment of the 
national government on state autonomy.  For example, in 
Gregory v. Ashcroft,17 the Court announced that when the 
application of a federal statute would “upset the usual 
constitutional balance of federal and state powers,” Congress 
 
10 See Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (invalidating the civil remedy provision of the 
Violence Against Women Act); Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (striking down the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act). 
11 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598 (finding the civil remedy provision of the 
Violence Against Women Act invalid under Section 5); City of Boerne v. Flores, 
521 U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act). 
12 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
13 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
14 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
15 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that Congress lacked the 
authority to subject the states to private, unconsenting suits for damages in state 
court under the Fair Labor Standards Act). 
16 See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002).  Perhaps 
as notably, in fashioning these doctrinal innovations, the Court has asserted itself as 
the ultimate arbiter of questions concerning the breadth of Congress’s power vis-à-
vis the states, invalidating national legislation on federalism grounds at a rate 
unseen in several generations.  See, e.g., David Franklin, Marijuana and Judicial 
Modesty, CHI. TRIB., June 9, 2005, at 27; Jeffrey Rosen, The End of Deference, NEW 
REPUBLIC, Nov. 6, 2000, at 39. 
17 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
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“must make its intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear in the 
language of the statute.’”18  The Court thus concluded that the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act did not apply to 
Missouri’s mandatory retirement age for state judges.19  
Similarly, in Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers,20 the Court invalidated as overly expansive the 
government’s “Migratory Bird Rule,” which defined the scope of 
the Clean Water Act to reach all waters forming a habitat for 
migratory birds.21  The Court explained that, “[w]here an 
administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits 
of Congress’ power,” Congress must make its intent to reach 
that result clear, especially when “the administrative 
interpretation alters the federal-state framework by permitting 
federal encroachment upon a traditional state power.”22 
Some have argued–and with some force–that the practical 
effects of these decisions have actually been quite modest.23  For 
instance, the Court’s Commerce Clause decisions affect only a 
small spectrum of activity that Congress might otherwise 
regulate–activity that is noncommercial, noneconomic, and 
purely intrastate.  The Court’s sovereign immunity decisions 
leave open a number of other means for enforcing federal law 
against state governments, most notably suits for injunctions 
under Ex parte Young.24  And the Court’s anticommandeering 
decisions prohibit a form of legislation that Congress had 
employed only rarely and for which there is typically a range of 
substitutes.  Perhaps most significantly, the Rehnquist Court did 
 
18 Id. at 460 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 
(1985)). 
19 Id. at 470. 
20 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
21 Id. at 174. 
22 Id. at 172, 173; see also Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858 (2000) 
(invoking the same canon of constitutional doubt to hold that the federal arson 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), does not apply to owner-occupied residences that have 
not been used for any commercial purpose); Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United 
States, 529 U.S. 765 (2000) (holding that a private individual could not bring a qui 
tam action against a state under the False Claims Act because the states are not 
“persons” subject to suit under the Act); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 
U.S. 58 (1989) (holding that neither a state nor its officials, when acting in their 
official capacities, were “persons” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
23 See sources cited supra note 4. 
24 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
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nothing to curtail Congress’s authority under the Spending 
Clause, leaving Congress the ability to circumvent most of these 
constraints by enacting conditional spending legislation.25 
But even if the Rehnquist Court’s decisions did not amount to 
a “federalism revolution,” they still marked a noteworthy 
constitutional event and thus have received a great deal of 
attention, scholarly and otherwise.26  Importantly, though, this 
commentary has focused almost exclusively on only one half of 
the federalism equation, namely the Court’s decisions affecting 
the limits on Congress’s enumerated powers.  But federalism has 
another side: the constitutionally grounded, structural limits on 
the states.  These are the “union-preserving” rules of federalism, 
designed to protect national interests from the parochial 
tendencies of state or local governments.27  Viewing federalism 
only in terms of the breadth of the national government’s powers 
misses the less salient, but arguably no less significant, aspects of 
the federalism landscape.  In particular, it ignores the degree to 
which state governments can (or cannot) exercise policy-making 
autonomy in areas of concurrent federal and state regulatory 
jurisdiction, which is to say, most areas of modern American 
life.28 
At its core, federalism requires a constitutionalized division of 
power between the national and state governments, with rules 
that delineate the respective roles of each.29  While an 
unconstrained national government might swallow up the 
independent existence of the states–a point the Rehnquist 
Court repeatedly emphasized–so, too, might the states act in 
 
25 See Mark Tushnet, Alarmism Versus Moderation in Responding to the 
Rehnquist Court, 78 IND. L.J. 47, 52 (2003). 
26 Cf. Whittington, supra note 9, at 496 (explaining that, though the Rehnquist 
Court did not “storm[] the barricades of the centralized state while rallying the 
masses to its devolutionary banner,” its “federalism offensive [was] without 
question a political event”). 
27 I borrow the term “union-preserving” from 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-1 (3d ed. 2000). 
28 See Fallon, supra note 5, at 431–33; Massey, supra note 5, at 502–12; Young, 
supra note 5, at 130–34. 
29 The remainder of this Part draws freely from a similar discussion appearing in 
Bradley W. Joondeph, The Deregulatory Valence of Justice O’Connor’s Federalism, 
44 HOUS. L. REV. 507, 519–24 (2007). 
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ways that would effectively destroy the Union.30  Indeed, it was 
problems of this sort under the Articles of Confederation that 
led to the Constitution’s creation.31  A principal defect of the 
Articles was their failure to prevent the states from acting in self-
interested ways that undermined the interests of the nation as a 
whole.  Among other things, states imposed various barriers to 
interstate commerce, such as protective tariffs on goods from 
other states; failed to comply with the Continental Congress’s 
requisitions, the chief mechanism for funding the federal 
government; and encroached on the federal government’s 
authority by entering into compacts with each other and signing 
their own treaties with Indian tribes.32  As Chief Justice John 
Marshall observed in Gibbons v. Ogden,33 “If there was any one 
object riding over every other in the adoption of the 
constitution, it was to keep the commercial intercourse among 
the States free from all invidious and partial restraints.”34 
Structural limits on state authority have thus been a central 
aspect of American federalism from the beginning, and those 
limits remain critical elements of our governmental structure.35  
As a matter of constitutional law, the two most important such 
limits are the doctrine of preemption and the dormant 
Commerce Clause.  Grounded in the Supremacy Clause, the 
doctrine of preemption dictates that validly enacted federal laws 
 
30 This was, of course, the animating idea behind the Court’s holding in 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), that Maryland’s tax on the 
Bank of the United States was unconstitutional.  As Chief Justice Marshall wrote, 
to permit states such a power would be “in its nature incompatible with, and 
repugnant to, the constitutional laws of the Union.”  Id. at 425. 
31 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–
1787, at 132–61, 354–63, 393–429, 463–67 (1969); see also KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN 
& GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 123 (15th ed. 2004) (“[T]he poor 
condition of American commerce and the proliferating trade rivalries among the 
states were the immediate provocations for the calling of the Constitutional 
Convention.”). 
32 See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 9–11 (5th ed. 2005) 
(discussing Madison’s memorandum to himself in April 1787 in preparation for the 
Constitutional Convention); SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 31, at 123; see also 
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 164 (Max Farrand 
ed., 1911) (“Experience had evinced a constant tendency in the States to encroach 
on the federal authority; to violate national Treaties, to infringe the rights & 
interests of each other . . . .”). 
33 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
34 Id. at 28–29. 
35 TRIBE, supra note 27, § 6–1, at 1021. 
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shall trump any state laws with which they conflict.  The dormant 
Commerce Clause, on the other hand, generally nullifies state 
laws that discriminate against or place undue burdens on 
interstate commerce.  Cases involving these union-preserving 
aspects of federalism typically receive less attention than those 
addressing the breadth of Congress’s legislative authority; they 
are often fact-specific and turn on the precise scope or purpose 
of the state or federal statutes at issue.  Still, the overall 
trajectory of these decisions is quite important to the federal-
state balance–perhaps even more important to the values of 
federalism than the high-profile cases addressing the limits on 
Congress’s enumerated powers. 
Consider preemption: so long as Congress acts within its 
enumerated powers, it can displace state law addressing the 
same subject, and it can do so in express or implied terms.  The 
fields regulated by the federal government have grown 
dramatically over the last century, such that federal law now 
reaches into almost every corner of national life.  From crime to 
occupational safety to environmental protection, federal law 
governs private conduct that generally was subject only to state 
control for the nation’s first 150 years.  Granted, some of the 
Rehnquist Court’s decisions have narrowed the breadth of 
Congress’s legislative powers.  But they have done so only at the 
margins; Congress can still regulate any activity that is economic 
or commercial in nature, as well as a good deal of activity that is 
not.36 
 
36 As the Court clarified in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), noneconomic, 
noncommercial, purely intrastate activities are still subject to federal regulation if 
Congress rationally “concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would 
undercut” a larger, comprehensive scheme that, taken as a whole, plainly regulates 
interstate commerce.  Id. at 18.  Moreover, Congress can cure any constitutionally 
deficient statute by adding a “jurisdictional element”–language that ensures, on a 
case-by-case basis, that the regulated activity has a sufficient connection to 
interstate commerce.  See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000); 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).  In fact, this is precisely what 
happened in the wake of the Court’s decision in Lopez.  A year later, Congress 
amended the Gun-Free School Zones Act to add eleven words to 18 U.S.C. § 
922(q)(2)(A), defining the relevant offense as the knowing possession of “a firearm 
that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce at a place 
that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.”  Act 
of Sept. 30, 1996, Pub. L. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–370 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 
922(q)(2)(A) (2008)) (emphasis added). 
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In short, the vast majority of human activity in the United 
States today is regulable by both the federal government and the 
states.  As a result, the frequency with which courts conclude 
that federal statutes have displaced state law within this 
expansive realm of concurrent jurisdiction is quite important to 
the breadth and significance of the states’ residuary powers.  To 
cite only a few recent examples, the scope of preemption 
determines the states’ leeway to regulate in the field of 
immigration and naturalization;37 to regulate automobile 
emissions in an effort to reduce greenhouse gases;38 to use their 
investment and procurement practices to express their moral 
objections to the human rights records of foreign regimes;39 to 
police the practices of health maintenance organizations;40 and 
to regulate the labeling and marketing of tobacco products, 
especially to minors.41  These issues might be narrow in a 
constitutional sense, but they are collectively quite important to 
the states’ role in American government as centers of policy-
making authority. 
The same is largely true of dormant Commerce Clause cases, 
which present similar legal issues.  As with preemption, dormant 
Commerce Clause cases generally ask whether various state laws 
shall be displaced by national interests in uniformity or 
efficiency.  Instead of being trumped by a federal statute or 
regulation, however, state laws are invalid under the dormant 
 
37 See, e.g., Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 518, 532 (M.D. Pa. 
2007) (holding that the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act preempted a 
city ordinance that prohibited employing, “harboring,” or renting housing to 
undocumented aliens); Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Coming Soon–A City ID?, S.F. 
CHRON., Sept. 30, 2007, at E1. 
38 See John M. Broder, Federal Judge Upholds Law on Emissions in California, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2007, at A32 (reporting that the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of California had upheld, against a preemption challenge from the 
automobile industry, a California law regulating the emission of greenhouse gases 
from motor vehicles). 
39 See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000); Bd. of Trs. v. 
Mayor and City Council of Balt., 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989). 
40 See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004); Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans 
v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003); Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 
(2002); see also Theodore W. Ruger, The Supreme Court Federalizes Managed Care 
Liability, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 528 (2004). 
41 See Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 128 S. Ct. 989 (2008); Lorillard 
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 
U.S. 504 (1992). 
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Commerce Clause when they discriminate against or unduly 
burden interstate commerce.  For instance, recent cases have 
addressed whether states can create an income tax preference 
for municipal bonds issued by the taxing state or its political 
subdivisions,42 whether local governments can create municipally 
owned monopolies to process all solid waste in a given 
community,43 and whether states can impose income tax 
liabilities on out-of-state businesses that derive profits from the 
taxing state but which have no physical presence there.44 
Preemption and dormant Commerce Clause cases therefore 
present a choice about the breadth of the states’ policy-making 
autonomy.  The more willing courts are to invalidate state and 
local laws on these grounds, the less breathing space state and 
local governments will enjoy to pursue their own initiatives.  As 
Justice Breyer has suggested, 
[I]n today’s world, filled with legal complexity, the true test of 
federalist principle may lie, not in the occasional constitutional 
effort to trim Congress’ commerce power at its edges, or to 
protect a State’s treasury from a private damages action, but 
rather in those many statutory cases where courts interpret the 
mass of technical detail that is the ordinary diet of the law.
45
 
A complete accounting of the Rehnquist Court’s approach to 
federalism therefore needs to go beyond the high-profile 
decisions like Lopez, Morrison, and Garrett, which address the 
outermost margins of the national government’s authority.  It 
must also deal with the “ordinary diet” of inframarginal cases, 
where both the national government and the states possess the 
authority to legislate.  That is, it must grapple with the Court’s 
record in preemption and dormant Commerce Clause cases, the 
subject to which I now turn. 
 
42 See Dep’t of Rev. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008). 
43 See United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 
S. Ct. 1786 (2007). 
44 See Tax Comm’r v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 640 S.E.2d 226 (W. Va. 2006), 
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2997 (2007). 
45 Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 160–61 (2001) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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II 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Given its aggressive enforcement of the federalism-based 
limits on Congress’s enumerated powers, one might reasonably 
have expected the Rehnquist Court to have approached the 
union-preserving side of federalism with a similar orientation.46  
Indeed, because preemption and dormant Commerce Clause 
cases typically are not as salient as those involving the breadth of 
Congress’s authority, they probably offered the Court even more 
political space for pursuing an agenda to expand state autonomy, 
as decisions in such a direction were unlikely to provoke much 
political resistance.  But there was no federalism offensive with 
respect to preemption or the dormant Commerce Clause.47  
Whether one evaluates the Court’s decisions qualitatively (in 
terms of their substantive legal content) or quantitatively (by 
counting the Justices’ respective votes for particular outcomes), 
the same basic conclusion emerges: in this domain, the 
Rehnquist Court sided with the forces for centralization. 
A.  Doctrine 
Between October 1991, when Justice Thomas joined the 
Court, and September 2005, when Chief Justice Rehnquist 
passed away, the Supreme Court handed down seventy-six full-
dress opinions in cases involving the dormant Commerce Clause 
or the doctrine of preemption.  In general terms the Court left 
the doctrines surrounding these areas largely as it found them.48  
This is significant by itself, given the change the Court initiated 
with respect to the federalism-based constraints on Congress.  
More interesting still is that, to the extent the Rehnquist Court 
did alter the law governing preemption and the dormant 
Commerce Clause, the Justices actually undermined state 
authority. 
 
46 Cf. Fallon, supra note 5, at 460 (“It is easy to imagine that a Supreme Court 
committed to revitalizing constitutional federalism might adopt a revisionist stance 
toward dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.”). 
47 See id. at 469–72. 
48 Part II.A borrows from a similar, somewhat dated discussion in Bradley W. 
Joondeph, Bush v. Gore, Federalism, and the Distrust of Politics, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1781, 1790–1804 (2001). 
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Conditions certainly seemed ripe for the Court to press an 
agenda for change.  Consider the dormant Commerce Clause.  
Two Justices, Scalia and Thomas, openly called for the Court to 
abandon its enforcement of the Clause’s negative implications.  
Scalia stated on more than one occasion that there is no “clear 
theoretical underpinning for judicial ‘enforcement’ of the 
Commerce Clause” and that the Court’s “applications of the 
doctrine have, not to put too fine a point on the matter, made no 
sense.”49  Likewise, Thomas embraced the view that “the 
underlying justifications for [the Court’s] involvement in the 
negative aspects of the Commerce Clause... are illusory” and 
that the Court’s jurisprudence in the area “undermines the 
delicate balance in what we have termed ‘Our Federalism.’”50  
Scalia and Thomas offered not just two votes in favor of the 
states but also fairly detailed historical and theoretical 
justifications for transforming the law surrounding the dormant 
Commerce Clause.  This, in turn, would have given such changes 
a fair measure of intellectual and academic credibility.51 
Moreover, state governments brought cases to the Court that 
presented the Justices with clear opportunities to remake the 
law.  On at least three occasions, states litigating cases expressly 
called on the Court to discard broad swaths of its dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  For instance, in Quill Corp. v. 
North Dakota,52 the State of North Dakota (joined by at least 
twenty-nine other states as amici curiae) asked the Court to 
overturn its 1967 decision, National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. 
Department of Revenue,53 which had held that states cannot 
require out-of-state sellers to collect use taxes on sales to the 
taxing state’s residents if the seller has no physical presence in 
the taxing state.54  Changed circumstances arguably rendered the 
physical presence requirement obsolete, and the dramatic 
growth of the mail-order industry had increased the rule’s 
 
49 Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Rev., 483 U.S. 232, 260 (1987) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
50 Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 612 
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
51 Cf. Whittington, supra note 9, at 501 (discussing how “the intellectual context 
of the Rehnquist Court era help[ed] legitimate the Court’s federalism offensive”). 
52 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
53 386 U.S. 753 (1967). 
54 Id. at 758–60. 
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financial burden (in foregone tax revenue) on the states.55  Still, 
in an 8–1 decision, the Court sustained Bellas Hess.56  Conceding 
that the physical presence requirement was “artificial at its 
edges,” the Court reasoned that this “artificiality” was 
outweighed by the benefits of reduced litigation, settled 
expectations (which would “foster[] investment by businesses 
and individuals”), and respecting the “substantial reliance” on 
the rule, which “has become part of the basic framework of a 
sizeable industry.”57  To the Court, these practical economic 
benefits counted for more than the states’ ability to close a large 
loophole in their sales tax structures.58 
In Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation,59 the 
State of New Jersey asked the Justices to discard the centerpiece 
of the Court’s framework for analyzing state income taxes 
imposed on out-of-state businesses.60  Under established 
precedent, a state could tax an apportioned share of an out-of-
state taxpayer’s income so long as that income was earned as 
part of the taxpayer’s unitary business operating in the taxing 
 
55 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 303–04. 
56 Id. at 314–19. 
57 Id. at 315–17. 
58 Presently, the federal Internet Tax Nondiscrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 108–
435, §§ 1101–04, 118 Stat. 2615, 2615–17 (2004), prohibits states from imposing any 
“[m]ultiple or discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce.”  § 1101(a)(2).  But 
requiring out-of-state sellers to collect use taxes on interstate sales would be neither 
a multiple nor a discriminatory tax, as it would merely extend the existing tax 
burden on in-state sales to all retailers, regardless of their physical location.  See 
Walter Hellerstein, Internet Tax Freedom Act Limits States’ Power to Tax Internet 
Access and Electronic Commerce, 90 J. TAX’N 5, 6–8 (1999).  Thus, it is Quill that 
prevents states from being able to apply their sales and use taxes equally to 
purchases from in-state and out-of-state retailers.  See Wade Anderson & Christine 
Monzingo, Taxing Electronic Commerce, 20 ST. TAX NOTES 521 (2001).  A 
University of Tennessee study estimated that the inability to tax Internet sales from 
out-of-state retailers with no physical presence in the taxing state will cost states 
roughly $20 billion annually in foregone tax revenue in 2003.  See David Brunori, 
Mad on Main Street: Retailers and Internet Taxation, 19 ST. TAX NOTES 765, 765 
(2000). 
59 504 U.S. 768 (1992). 
60 New Jersey made this argument as an alternative defense of the judgment 
below in its favor.  Id. at 783–88.  Because the state’s argument went well beyond 
the point on which the Court had originally granted certiorari, the Justices ordered 
the case reargued, and the parties filed supplemental briefs on the new, much 
broader question.  See Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 503 U.S. 928 
(1992). 
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state.61  Conversely, a state could not tax income derived from 
discrete business activities that were unrelated to the taxpayer’s 
activities in the state.62  New Jersey argued that this “unitary 
business principle” was an unjustified restraint on the states’ 
taxing powers and asked the Court to declare that all income 
earned by an out-of-state business could be taxed on an 
apportioned basis by a state in which the taxpayer did business.63  
But, as in Quill, the Court adhered to its dormant Commerce 
Clause precedent, reasoning that New Jersey had failed to 
demonstrate that the unitary business principle was either 
unsound in principle or unworkable in practice.64 
Finally, the State of Alabama, in defending its discriminatory 
capital stock tax, argued in South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. 
Alabama65 that the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause 
precedent represented “an unconstitutional assumption of 
powers by the Courts of the United States”66 and “should be 
abandoned.”67  With respect to the federal-state balance, the 
state contended that “the Court’s negative Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence simply does not comport with the central axiom 
underlying our federal system” that “the States possess 
sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government, 
subject only to the limitations imposed by the Supremacy 
Clause.”68  Because the State had not raised this argument until 
it filed its brief on the merits, the Court treated it as waived and 
did not address it.69  But Justice O’Connor wrote a separate, 
two-sentence concurring opinion specifically to note that “the 
State does nothing that would persuade me to reconsider or 
abandon our well-established body of negative Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence.”70 
 
61 Allied-Signal, 504 U.S. at 772. 
62 Id. at 773. 
63 See id. at 777, 784. 
64 See id. at 777–88. 
65 526 U.S. 160 (1999). 
66 Brief for Respondents at 7, S. Cent. Bell, 526 U.S. 160 (No. 97–2045) (quoting 
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938)). 
67 Id. at 28. 
68 Id. at 42 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991)). 
69 S. Cent. Bell, 526 U.S. at 171. 
70 Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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In addition to declining these invitations to broaden state 
regulatory autonomy, the Rehnquist Court effectively overruled 
precedent so as to strengthen the federalism-based restraints on 
state authority.  Consider the Court’s 2005 decision in Granholm 
v. Heald.71  At issue was whether states could permit in-state 
wineries to ship wine to consumers within their borders while 
prohibiting out-of-state wineries from doing the same, at least on 
equal terms.72  Several Supreme Court decisions handed down 
nearly contemporaneously with the adoption of the Twenty-first 
Amendment seemed to hold that such state regulation was 
constitutional, protected by the Twenty-first Amendment from 
dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.  For instance, in State 
Board of Equalization v. Young’s Market Co.,73 the Court upheld 
a $500 license fee imposed by California on the importation of 
beer into the state, holding that the Twenty-first Amendment 
“confer[s] upon the State the power to forbid all importations 
which do not comply with the conditions which it prescribes.”74  
The idea that the states must permit “imported liquors [to] 
compete with the domestic on equal terms,” said the Court, 
“would involve not a construction of the Amendment, but a 
rewriting of it.”75  In Granholm, however, the Court essentially 
discarded Young’s Market and several similar decisions, 
concluding that the dormant Commerce Clause prohibits any 
such discrimination in the interstate liquor market.76 
Or consider the broad conception of “facial discrimination” 
embraced by the Court in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of 
Clarkstown,77 which Justice Souter characterized in dissent as 
“greatly extending the Clause’s dormant reach.”78  At issue was a 
 
71 544 U.S. 460 (2005). 
72 Id. at 465–66. 
73 299 U.S. 59 (1936). 
74 Id. at 62. 
75 Id.; see also Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm’n, 305 U.S. 391, 
394 (1939) (stating that “the right of a state to prohibit or regulate the importation 
of intoxicating liquor is not limited by the commerce clause,” including regulation 
that discriminates against imported liquors); Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 
U.S. 401, 403 (1938) (holding that a state law that “clearly discriminates in favor of 
liquor processed within the State as against liquor completely processed elsewhere” 
was constitutional under the holding of Young’s Market). 
76 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 493. 
77 511 U.S. 383 (1994). 
78 Id. at 411 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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“flow control” ordinance enacted by Clarkstown, New York, 
which required all solid wastes generated or brought into the 
municipality to be processed at a designated transfer station in 
the city.79  The purpose was to guarantee sufficient revenue to 
pay for the facility’s construction, a facility that would ultimately 
be owned by the city.80  The ordinance did not favor local 
businesses as a class over out-of-state or nonlocal competitors; 
instead, it granted a monopoly in waste processing to a specific 
local transfer station.81  The Court nevertheless held that the 
ordinance facially discriminated against interstate commerce 
because the favored facility was local.82 
Other Rehnquist Court dormant Commerce Clause decisions 
have the same effect.  In Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. 
Town of Harrison,83 the Court extended the scope of the 
Clause’s scrutiny to include the state regulation of nonprofit 
organizations, striking down a Maine property tax provision that 
disadvantaged charitable institutions predominantly serving out-
of-state residents.84  In West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,85 the 
Court held that a Massachusetts combined tax-and-subsidy 
program designed to aid the state’s dairy industry was 
impermissible, even though both the tax and the subsidy would 
likely have been considered constitutional had they been 
enacted separately.86  And, in American Trucking Ass’ns v. 
Scheiner,87 the Court overruled a long line of precedent to hold 
that a flat axle tax imposed on truckers for the privilege of using 
a state’s highways was unconstitutional.88 
The general theme of the Rehnquist Court’s preemption 
decisions was similar.  As with the dormant Commerce Clause, 
the Court did nothing doctrinally to provide greater protection 
 
79 Id. at 386. 
80 Id. at 387, 393. 
81 See id. at 403–04 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
82 Id. at 391. 
83 520 U.S. 564 (1997). 
84 Id. at 583–88, 595. 
85 512 U.S. 186 (1994). 
86 Id. at 194–96, 199. 
87 483 U.S. 266 (1987). 
88 Id. at 292–97 (overruling Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542 
(1950), Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Bd. of R.R. Comm’rs, 332 U.S. 495 (1947), 
and Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 295 U.S. 285 (1935)). 
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for state autonomy.  This may have been most surprising with 
respect to so-called “obstacle” preemption.  Even where federal 
and state law might be construed as complementary, and where 
Congress has been silent with respect to its intent to displace 
state regulation, the doctrine of obstacle preemption empowers 
courts to infer from a federal statute’s implicit objectives or 
overall structure an unstated congressional intent to displace 
state law.  This gives the federal judiciary fairly broad discretion 
to nullify exercises of traditional state police powers.89  As a 
result, it has been the subject of substantial criticism, both for its 
tenuous theoretical foundation90 and for its failure to afford 
sufficient respect for state sovereignty interests.91  Yet the 
Rehnquist Court evidenced few misgivings in using obstacle 
preemption to set aside a number of state laws.92 
As with the dormant Commerce Clause, the few alterations 
that the Rehnquist Court made in the law governing preemption 
tended, at least marginally, to compromise state autonomy.  
Consider its decisions concerning the impact of a federal 
statute’s express preemption clause on implied preemption 
analysis.  In the 1992 case of Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,93 
 
89 As Justice Kennedy observed in Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management 
Ass’n, “A freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension with 
federal objectives would undercut the principle that it is Congress rather than the 
courts that preempts state law.”  505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in judgment). 
90 See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 265–90 (2000) 
(arguing that there is no constitutional basis for “obstacle” preemption); Paul 
Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
69, 71 (1988) (arguing that “obstacle” preemption doctrine “forces the courts either 
to search quixotically for the ‘spirit’ of a statute, or to choose between two 
doctrinally deficient theories of preemption”). 
91 See, e.g., S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican 
Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 687 (1991) (“Federal preemption decisions impede the 
ability of those governmental bodies that are structured to be most responsive to 
citizens’ public values and ideas–state and local governments–and have 
concomitantly undermined citizens’ rights to participate directly in governing 
themselves.”); Wolfson, supra note 90, at 114 (“The current jurisprudence of 
preemption . . . fails to protect the political and judicial safeguards of federalism.”). 
92 See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141 (2001); Buckman Co. v. 
Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade 
Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Corp., 529 U.S. 861 
(2000); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (2000); United States v. Locke, 
529 U.S. 89 (2000). 
93 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
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which addressed whether the federal statutes governing cigarette 
labeling and advertising preempt state common-law tort claims, 
the Court indicated that the existence of an express preemption 
provision foreclosed implied preemption.94  But only three years 
later, in Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick,95 the Court backtracked, 
stating that Cipollone established no “categorical rule precluding 
the coexistence of express and implied pre-emption.”96  Rather, 
Cipollone “[a]t best... supports an inference that an express pre-
emption clause forecloses implied pre-emption.”97  In Geier v. 
American Honda Motor Corp.,98 the Court discarded this 
remaining “inference” left by Myrick, holding that the existence 
of an “express pre-emption provision imposes no unusual, 
‘special burden’ against pre-emption”99 and that “ordinary pre-
emption principles” apply.100  As the Court subsequently 
reiterated in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee,101 “[t]o 
the extent respondent posits that anything other than our 
ordinary pre-emption principles apply” because Congress 
included an express preemption provision, “that contention must 
fail.”102 
The Rehnquist Court also narrowed the traditional 
presumption against preemption, or at least clarified the 
presumption’s contours in a way that makes preemption more 
likely.  Since at least its 1947 decision in Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp.,103 the Court has frequently reiterated that there 
is a “presumption against finding pre-emption of state law in 
areas traditionally regulated by the States,” such that the Court 
will assume “that the historic police powers of the States were 
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear 
 
94 Id. at 517 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 505 (1978), and 
Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282 (1987)). 
95 514 U.S. 280 (1995). 
96 Id. at 288. 
97 Id. at 289. 
98 529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
99 Id. at 873. 
100 Id. at 874. 
101 531 U.S. 341 (2001). 
102 Id. at 352. 
103 331 U.S. 218 (1947). 
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and manifest purpose of Congress.”104  The Rehnquist Court 
continued to endorse this starting point for preemption analysis, 
invoking it on several occasions.105  But it also emphasized the 
presumption’s negative implication: where the subject is one that 
the states have not traditionally regulated, the presumption does 
not apply.  For instance, United States v. Locke106 involved 
regulations imposed by the State of Washington on oil tankers 
traveling in Puget Sound.107  Concluding that the state 
regulations were preempted by the federal Ports and Waterways 
Safety Act, the Court underscored that “an ‘assumption’ of 
nonpre-emption is not triggered when the State regulates in an 
area where there has been a history of significant federal 
presence.”108  The Court subsequently held in Buckman that 
state tort actions based on the defendant’s fraudulent disclosures 
to the Food and Drug Administration were preempted by the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.109  Even though the Court in 
several previous preemption decisions had recognized that states 
have “great latitude” to “exercise[] their police powers to 
protect the health and safety of their citizens,”110 the Court 
emphasized in Buckman that “[p]olicing fraud against federal 
agencies is hardly ‘a field which the States have traditionally 
occupied.’”111  Consequently, “no presumption against pre-
emption obtain[ed].”112 
To be sure, there were many cases in which the Rehnquist 
Court upheld state laws against preemption or dormant 
Commerce Clause challenges.113  Still, it is clear that, taken as a 
 
104 California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989) (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. 
at 230). 
105 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 540–41 (2001); 
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 146 (2001); Medtronic, Inc. v. 
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 
(1992). 
106 529 U.S. 89 (2000). 
107 See id. at 97, 117–19. 
108 Id. at 108. 
109 Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001). 
110 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 475 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
111 Buckman, 531 U.S. at 347 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 
218, 230 (1947)). 
112 Id. at 348. 
113 See, e.g., Mid-Con Freight Sys., Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 440 
(2005); Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429 (2005); 
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whole, the Rehnquist Court’s decisions in these areas did not 
alter constitutional doctrine so as to provide the states with 
greater autonomy to pursue their own policy initiatives.  Rather, 
to the extent the Court disrupted prevailing understandings, it 
did so in a manner that placed a higher value on national 
uniformity and economic efficiency than on the preservation of 
states’ policy-making authority. 
B.  Voting Records 
Another means of evaluating the Rehnquist Court’s decisions 
is through a quantitative analysis of the Justices’ voting records.  
Though numerical tallies of the Justices’ votes in favor of certain 
outcomes can be a rather crude measure of the Court’s work,114 
such studies nonetheless can reveal general patterns of judicial 
behavior.  After all, the outcome a Justice supports in a given 
case is often the single most revealing piece of information about 
his or her views.  Moreover, studying votes allows us to record 
the Justices’ positions quite objectively, reducing the potential 
for bias in our data collection.  While outcome-based analysis 
cannot answer all of the interesting questions about judicial 
 
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005); Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 
541 U.S. 125 (2004); Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003); 
Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003); Sprietsma v. Mercury 
Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002); City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecking Serv., 
Inc., 536 U.S. 424 (2002); Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911 (1997); Cal. Div. of 
Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316 
(1997); Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996); Freightliner 
Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995); Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 
514 U.S. 175 (1995) (upholding Oklahoma’s unapportioned sales tax imposed on 
the purchase of bus tickets for interstate travel); Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise 
Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994) (rejecting dormant Commerce Clause challenge to 
California’s worldwide combined income reporting system for affiliated 
corporations); Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, 510 U.S. 355 (1994); Dep’t of 
Rev. v. ACF Indus., 510 U.S. 332 (1994); Trinova Corp. v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 
498 U.S. 358 (1991) (sustaining Michigan’s apportioned value-added tax, even as 
applied to value added through manufacturing activities that occurred outside the 
state); Amerada Hess Corp. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 490 U.S. 66 (1989) (upholding 
New Jersey’s denial of deduction for federal windfall profits tax imposed on oil 
producers, even though taxpayers did not produce oil in New Jersey); Goldberg v. 
Sweet, 488 U.S. 252 (1989) (sustaining Illinois’s unapportioned gross receipts tax on 
all telecommunications that were billed to a service address in Illinois and were 
initiated or terminated in the state). 
114 See Frank B. Cross, Thomas A. Smith & Antonio Tomarchio, The Reagan 
Revolution in the Network of Law 7 (Soc. Sci. Research Network, Working Paper 
Series, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=909217. 
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decision making,115 it is an important part of the mix of tools that 
can shed light on the Court’s behavior.116 
To conduct such an analysis here, I compiled a unique data set 
of federalism decisions handed down by the Rehnquist Court.117  
It includes every federalism decision in which the Court issued a 
signed opinion where the question presented fell into one of two 
categories.118  The first category consists of those decisions 
involving a structural constraint on the powers of the national 
government (i.e., the Commerce Clause, the Spending Clause, 
the Tenth Amendment, the Eleventh Amendment, or Section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment).  The second category consists 
of decisions involving the dormant Commerce Clause or the 
doctrine of preemption.119  The purpose of this categorization is 
 
115 See Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 261, 265–67 
(2006). 
116 See Howard Gillman, What’s Law Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists 
Test the “Legal Model” of Judicial Decisionmaking, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 465, 
494–95 (2001) (describing the importance of such studies, even if they should be 
supplemented with historical and interpretivist inquiries). 
117 The data set and accompanying codebook are available at http://claranet 
.scu.edu/coursepage.asp?cid=2086&page=01 (last visited Oct. 4, 2008). 
118 Every decision included in the study is listed in this Article’s appendix infra. 
119 The cases included in the study were identified in the following manner: 
* First, I conducted searches in Westlaw’s Supreme Court database (SCT) searching 
for references to one of the relevant constitutional provisions or doctrines in the 
headnotes of opinions.  Thus, I ran queries such as “he(“eleventh amendment”),” 
“he(preempt!),” and “he(“commerce clause”)” for each of the relevant provisions 
or doctrines. 
* Second, I read the text of each opinion generated by these queries to determine 
whether the Court’s holding–its ultimate legal judgment in the case–addressed 
the provision or doctrine queried.  In many cases it did not, as the opinion simply 
referred to the relevant doctrine for other reasons, such as to draw an analogy.  
Such cases were excluded from the universe. 
* Third, my research assistant conducted searches in the Lexis-Nexis Supreme 
Court database (U.S. Supreme Court Cases, Lawyers’ Edition) searching for 
references to one of the relevant constitutional provisions or doctrines in the full 
text of opinions.  For instance, he ran the queries “(eleventh OR 11th) w/3 
amendment” and “(tenth OR 10th) w/3 amendment.” 
* Fourth, my research assistant then read these opinions and excluded those whose 
holdings were clearly unrelated to the queried constitutional provisions or 
doctrines, erring on the side of inclusion. 
* Fifth, after my research assistant compiled lists of decisions involving the various 
provisions and doctrines, I compared these lists to those that I had generated using 
Westlaw.  I read all of the cases on my research assistant’s lists that did not appear 
on my lists. 
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to gain traction on the question whether the Justices’ 
commitment to state autonomy differed depending on whether 
the federalism-based limit constrained Congress or the states.  
For each case, I coded the Justices’ votes as either favoring or 
disfavoring the outcome that enhanced state autonomy.120 
Because there is no neutral baseline against which to measure 
the Justices’ voting records, the study compares the Justices’ 
records to each other.  That is, it captures the Justices’ relative 
commitments to state autonomy.  Although imperfect in some 
respects, such comparative analysis can nonetheless be telling, as 
I believe the results below illustrate.  Further, the study presents 
the data for two distinct (but overlapping) time frames.  The first 
is from October 1991, when Justice Thomas joined the Court, to 
 
* Finally, I added to the study universe those cases discovered by my research 
assistant (which I had not found in Westlaw) where the Court’s holding directly 
addressed the queried provision or doctrine. 
120 In most cases, such coding decisions were straightforward.  Nevertheless, 
three issues are worth mentioning.  First, several cases presented two separate 
federalism issues that addressed distinct constitutional provisions or doctrines.  For 
example, in Morrison, the Court addressed two questions: (1) whether the civil 
remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act was within Congress’s 
commerce power, and (2) whether it was valid legislation under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619 (2000).  In 
cases like this, I treated the Justices’ positions on the two issues as two distinct votes 
and coded them accordingly. 
Second, some cases presented multiple claims raised under the same constitutional 
provision or doctrine.  In several preemption cases, for example, the Court 
addressed whether a variety of state law actions were preempted by federal law.  In 
these cases, I coded a Justice’s split vote–typically, a vote that one claim was 
preempted while another one was not–as half of a vote for each outcome.  This 
follows the protocol of another recent empirical study of the Rehnquist Court’s 
voting patterns in preemption cases.  See Greve & Klick, supra note 5, at 94.  This is 
essentially an arbitrary judgment, but treating each claim within a preemption 
decision as a separate case risked distorting the results through an overpopulation 
of preemption votes. 
Finally, some cases defied simple classification as to the constitutional provision at 
issue.  For instance, in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 
531 U.S. 356 (2001), the Court held that Congress had not validly abrogated the 
states’ sovereign immunity from private suits for damages because Title I of the 
ADA was not valid Section 5 legislation.  Id. at 374.  One might deem this either an 
Eleventh Amendment decision or a Section 5 decision, but including it in both 
would effectively count a single vote twice.  Thus, I simply assigned these cases to 
one category or the other.  In this instance, I classified Garrett and similar decisions 
as Section 5 cases.  Such judgments about categorization are only matters of form, 
as the study ultimately combines Eleventh Amendment and Section 5 cases under 
the broader heading of federalism decisions involving the limits on the national 
government. 
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September 2005, when Chief Justice Rehnquist passed away.  
This period covers the fifteen terms in which the five Justices 
widely recognized as responsible for the Rehnquist Court’s 
federalism revival–Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and 
Thomas–served together.  The second time frame is from 
October 1994, when Justice Breyer joined the Court, to 
September 2005.  I present the data from this period separately 
because the same nine Justices served together for these eleven 
terms, facilitating a comparison of the Justices’ records to one 
another in precisely the same, relatively large universe of 
decisions. 
1.  October 1991 to September 2005 
Over these fourteen terms, the Court handed down 103 signed 
opinions on the merits in federalism cases (as defined above), 
five of which raised multiple federalism issues (and thus yielded 
multiple votes per Justice).  Of these, twenty-seven cases 
involved the constitutional limits on Congress’s powers (yielding 
twenty-nine distinct votes).  And the Justices’ voting records in 
these cases are much as one would have expected: Rehnquist, 
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas typically voted to 
invalidate the assertion of federal authority at issue, while the 
other four Justices typically dissented.  This pattern is especially 
clear in the Court’s twenty nonunanimous votes, as Table 1 
demonstrates.  These differences, in all decisions and in 
nonunanimous decisions, are statistically significant at the P=.01 
level.121  The Justices who led the federalism offensive were 
 
121 One can demonstrate that the differences are statistically significant–that is, 
likely the result of genuine differences in the Justices’ behavior rather than a 
product of the random mix of cases that happened to come before the Court—
through a simple difference in proportions Z-test.  See DAVID S. MOORE, THE 
BASIC PRACTICE OF STATISTICS 504–07, 520–24 (4th ed. 2007).  The standard 
deviation (SD) of the differences equals the root of ((P1 × (1 – P1)) ÷ N1) + ((P2 × (1 
– P2)) ÷ N2), where P1 is the first proportion, P2 is the second proportion, N1 is the 
number of trials (or votes) out of which P1 is a proportion, and N2 is the number of 
trials (or votes) out of which P2 is a proportion.  The Z-score for the difference 
equals (P1 – P2) ÷ SD.  At the P=.05 level of confidence (where there is a 95% 
chance that the difference in the proportions is not the result of random chance), 
Z=1.96.  Thus, a Z-score of 1.96 or higher means statistical significance at the level 
of P=.05.  At the P=.01 level of confidence (where there is a 99% chance that the 
difference in the proportions is not the result of random chance), Z=2.58.  Thus, a 
Z-score of 2.58 or higher means statistical significance at the P=.01 level. 
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remarkably unified in their drive to reinvigorate the structural 
constraints on Congress, and the Court almost always split five 
to four. 
 
In Table 1, the Z-score for the difference in all decisions (69.7% versus 9.6%) is 
12.763.  The Z-score for the difference in nonunanimous decisions (91.0% versus 
6.3%) is 21.466.  Because both of these Z-scores exceed 2.58, the differences are 
statistically significant at the P=.01 level. 
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TABLE 1 
PROPORTION OF VOTES IN FAVOR OF AUGMENTING STATE 
AUTONOMY IN CASES INVOLVING THE FEDERALISM-BASED 
LIMITS ON THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, 
OCTOBER 1991 TO JUNE 2005 
 
  
All Decisions 
(N=29) 
 
 
Nonunanimous Decisions 
(N=20) 
 
Rehnquist, O’Connor, 
Scalia, Kennedy, and 
Thomas 
 
 
69.7% 
N=145 
 
 
91.0% 
N=100 
 
Remaining four Justices  
 
9.6% 
N=114 
 
 
6.3% 
N=80 
 
Over the same fourteen terms, the Court handed down 
seventy-six preemption and dormant Commerce Clause 
decisions (yielding seventy-nine distinct votes), which reveal a 
very different picture than the Congress-limiting cases, at least 
with respect to state autonomy.  As Table 2 illustrates, 
Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas were much 
more ambivalent about state autonomy in this context.  Indeed, 
as a group they were substantially less likely than their four 
remaining colleagues to vote for the result that favored state 
autonomy.  In nonunanimous preemption and dormant 
Commerce Clause cases, they were roughly fifteen percent more 
apt to vote to invalidate the state law at issue, a difference that is 
statistically significant at the P=.01 level.122 
 
122 The Z–score for the difference in voting records in nonunanimous preemption 
and dormant Commerce Clause decisions is 2.8974.  The Z–score for the difference 
in voting records in all preemption and dormant Commerce Clause decisions is 
1.9254, which is just shy of statistical significance at the P=.05 level. 
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TABLE 2 
PROPORTION OF VOTES IN FAVOR OF AUGMENTING STATE 
AUTONOMY IN CASES INVOLVING PREEMPTION AND THE 
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE, 
OCTOBER 1991 TO JUNE 2005 
 
  
All Decisions 
(N=79) 
 
 
Nonunanimous 
Decisions 
(N=43) 
 
Rehnquist, 
O’Connor, Scalia, 
Kennedy, and 
Thomas 
 
 
 
45.2% 
N=385 
 
 
 
41.4% 
N=214 
 
Remaining four 
Justices 
 
52.5% 
N=314 
 
 
56.1% 
N=171 
 
Parsing the data further to examine the individual Justices’ 
voting records in preemption and dormant Commerce Clause 
cases gives us some additional details about how differently the 
Rehnquist Court approached the two sides of federalism.  As 
Table 3 shows, the four Justices who most frequently voted 
against the outcome favoring state autonomy in preemption and 
dormant Commerce Clause cases were all members of the 
“federalist five”: O’Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas. 
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TABLE 3 
PROPORTION OF VOTES IN FAVOR OF AUGMENTING STATE 
AUTONOMY IN CASES INVOLVING PREEMPTION AND THE 
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE, 
OCTOBER 1991 TO JUNE 2005 
(participation in a minimum of thirty decisions) 
 
 
 
 
All Decisions 
 
Nonunanimous 
Decisions 
 
O’Connor 
 
 
39.2% 
N=79 
 
 
31.4% 
N=43 
 
Kennedy 
 
 
39.9% 
N=79 
 
 
32.6% 
N=43 
 
Scalia 
 
 
41.9% 
N=74 
 
 
34.5% 
N=42 
 
Thomas 
 
49.3% 
N=76 
 
 
47.7% 
N=43 
 
Breyer 
 
49.1% 
N=53 
 
 
52.1% 
N=24 
 
Souter 
 
51.3% 
N=78 
 
 
53.6% 
N=42 
 
Stevens 
 
51.9% 
N=79 
 
 
54.7% 
N=43 
 
Rehnquist 
 
55.8% 
N=78 
 
 
60.5% 
N=43 
 
Ginsburg 
 
55.5% 
N=64 
 
 
63.3% 
N=30 
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2.  October 1994 to September 2005 
Over these eleven terms, during which the Court’s personnel 
remained unchanged, the Court handed down twenty-four 
decisions involving the limits on Congress’s enumerated powers.  
And again, Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas 
typically voted to invalidate the assertion of federal authority at 
issue, while Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer typically 
dissented.  Examining only the seventeen nonunanimous votes 
(which are all that really matter in measuring the Justices’ voting 
records in relation to each other), the polarization of the Court is 
fairly dramatic.  As Figure 1 shows, the Justices who led the 
federalism offensive were remarkably unified, and the Court 
almost always split five to four. 
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FIGURE 1 
PROPORTION OF VOTES IN FAVOR OF AUGMENTING STATE 
AUTONOMY IN FEDERALISM CASES ADDRESSING THE LIMITS 
ON CONGRESS–NONUNANIMOUS DECISIONS, 
OCTOBER 1994 TO JUNE 2005 
(N=17) 
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Over the same time period, the Court decided fifty-one cases 
involving preemption and the dormant Commerce Clause, 
yielding fifty-three distinct votes.  In these decisions, Rehnquist, 
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas were much less unified.  
Moreover, as a group they were less likely than their colleagues 
to vote for the outcome that enhanced state policy-making 
authority, a result that is fairly clear when one isolates the 
Court’s nonunanimous decisions.  Indeed, as Figure 2 illustrates, 
in the twenty-four votes between October 1994 and June 2005 in 
which the Justices disagreed over a preemption or dormant 
Commerce Clause dispute, O’Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and 
Rehnquist were the four Justices most likely to invalidate the 
state law in question. 
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FIGURE 2 
PROPORTION OF VOTES IN FAVOR OF AUGMENTING STATE 
AUTONOMY IN FEDERALISM CASES ADDRESSING THE LIMITS 
ON STATE GOVERNMENTS–NONUNANIMOUS DECISIONS, 
OCTOBER 1994 TO JUNE 2005 
(N=24) 
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III 
DISCUSSION 
As the foregoing demonstrates, there were at least two sides 
to the Rehnquist Court’s federalism project.  Rehnquist, 
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas were remarkably 
united in reinvigorating the structural constraints on Congress’s 
legislative authority, extending their push to limit the national 
government’s enumerated powers across a number of doctrinal 
fronts.  But these Justices charted a very different course with 
respect to state autonomy in preemption and the dormant 
Commerce Clause cases, where they tended to support outcomes 
that restricted the states’ capacity to pursue their own policy 
agendas.123  Why would a Court clearly dedicated to state 
autonomy in one context be apparently indifferent to it in 
 
123 See Fallon, supra note 5, at 460–63. 
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another?  What might account for these sharp differences in the 
two categories of cases, at least along the dimension of state 
policy-making authority? 
Of course, there are several possible explanations, and I do 
not endeavor in this article to offer a fully developed account of 
the Rehnquist Court’s federalism jurisprudence.  But the 
discussion that follows makes two points important to that 
inquiry.  First, and rather obviously, explanations of the 
Supreme Court’s behavior must take cognizance of the political 
and social environment in which the Court operates.  As history 
well documents, “the Court’s constitutional interpretations have 
always been influenced by the social and political contexts of the 
times in which they were rendered.”124  Thus, accounts of the 
Court’s decision making must be attentive to the Court’s 
institutional place and particularly the various mechanisms by 
which the larger political system shapes the Court’s actions. 
Second, given the institutional arrangements of American 
government, it should be unsurprising to find the political values 
of the ascendant national political coalition reflected in the 
Court’s decisions.  Reviewing the priorities of the political 
movement that gave rise to the Rehnquist Court–namely, the 
modern Republican Party–one tends to see its values expressed 
in the Court’s federalism decisions.  The modern GOP has 
generally supported the devolution of power to state and local 
governments, at least in the abstract, and it has specifically 
advocated the judicial enforcement of the limits on Congress’s 
enumerated powers.125  But the national GOP has never 
embraced a broader commitment to robust state autonomy as a 
matter of constitutional principle.126  Most important for present 
purposes, leading Republican officials in the federal government 
have repeatedly prioritized the substantive goal of reducing 
economic regulation over the more procedural goal of enhancing 
state autonomy.127  The Rehnquist Court’s federalism decisions 
reflected those values.128  Indeed, the decisions nicely translated 
 
124 MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS 449 (2004). 
125 See infra Part III.B. 
126 See id. 
127 See id. 
128 See Fallon, supra note 5, at 469 (noting that the Rehnquist Court’s “most pro-
federalism justices are also substantively conservative, and when substantive 
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this mix of political priorities–the promotion of state 
sovereignty, but not at the expense of increasing the stringency 
of regulation on private businesses–into constitutional doctrine. 
A.  The Supreme Court and American Politics 
Trying to account for Supreme Court decision making is a 
tricky business, and it is important to be clear about what one 
seeks to explain.  If the object of inquiry is the Justices’ 
conscious intentions, the conventional sources of constitutional 
law–the text, structure, history, tradition, and precedent–
surely have a significant impact.129  It defies logic to think that 
the Court’s elaborately reasoned opinions, and the carefully 
crafted arguments that the litigants present in similar terms, are 
purely a sham.  By all available accounts, the Justices earnestly 
believe that they are constrained by the law, at least to some 
degree, at least on most occasions.130  Of course, there remains a 
wide field of discretion, which the Justices readily acknowledge; 
law, particularly at the Supreme Court, does not operate as a 
straitjacket.131  Still, it seems plain that the Justices largely pursue 
their sincere understandings of what the Constitution requires.132 
 
conservatism conflicts with federalism values, substantive conservatism frequently 
prevails”). 
129 See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESEIGED 17 (1993) 
(“Generally speaking, when judges decide cases they do not feel completely 
unencumbered by existing legal rules and doctrines.”). 
130 For instance, Justices have routinely stated, both in their opinions and outside 
the Court, that the law forced them to reach results that produced policy 
consequences that they disdained.  See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 57 (2005) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting); Matt Labash, Evicting David Souter, WEEKLY STANDARD, Feb. 13, 
2006, at 20 (reporting on a speech given by Justice Stevens in which Stevens stated 
that in Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)–a majority opinion that Stevens 
himself authored–“the law compelled a result I would have opposed if I were a 
legislator”).  Of course, the Justices’ beliefs that their actions were purely a product 
of what the law dictated is probably naïve, as human beings generally have little 
sense of what influences their choices and behavior.  See infra notes 133–39 and 
accompanying text.  But my point here is simply that we have no reason to believe 
that these expressions are cynical or insincere. 
131 For instance, consider these remarks from Justice Breyer: 
[P]olitics in our decision-making process does not exist.  By politics, I mean 
Republicans versus Democrats, is this a popular action or not, will it help 
certain individuals be elected? . . . Personal ideology or philosophy is a 
different matter. . . . [J]udges have had different life experiences and 
different kinds of training, and they come from different backgrounds.  
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But the Justices’ subjective motivations can only take us so far 
in explaining the Court’s decisions.  Human beings are often, 
and perhaps mostly, unaware of why they hold particular beliefs 
or choose certain courses of action.133  As humans, we feel 
ourselves thinking, preferring, and choosing, but our subjective 
experiences are largely misleading.134  Much of our behavior is 
determined by unfelt features of our minds–motives, biases, 
knowledge structures, and the like–that work automatically, 
outside our fields of cognition.135  And these aspects of our 
interiors often render us quite susceptible to the external 
influence of social situations, forces much more powerful than 
we generally appreciate.136  More than we realize, our experience 
of conscious will is often an illusion.137  As Jon Hanson and 
David Yosifon have explained, 
 
Judges appointed by different presidents of different political parties may 
have different basic views about the interpretation of the law and its 
relation to the world.  Those kinds of differences of view are relevant to the 
legal questions before us and have an effect.  One cannot escape one’s own 
training or background. . . . Those differences of legal philosophy do 
matter.  I think the Constitution foresees such differences, and results that 
reflect such differences are perfectly proper. 
Patricia M. Wald, Last Thoughts, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 270, 271 (1999) (some 
alterations in original). 
132 See Gillman, supra note 116, at 490 (“When we set aside the unrealistic 
premise that legalistic behavior must look like formalistic decision making, then it 
has been fairly easy for empirical social scientists to find legal influences, even at 
the level of the Supreme Court in so-called hard cases.”). 
133 See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist 
Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 25 (2004) (arguing that human 
beings tend “to ‘see,’ and to attribute a powerful causal role to certain salient 
features of our interior lives that actually wield little or no causal influence over our 
behavior, while simultaneously failing to see those features of our interiors that are 
in fact highly influential”). 
134 See id. at 25–34. 
135 See generally id. at 34–133. 
136 See, e.g., SUSAN T. FISKE, SOCIAL BEINGS 7 (2004) (“Social behavior is, to a 
larger extent than people commonly realize, a response to people’s social situation, 
not a function of individual personality.”); PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER 
EFFECT 8 (2007) (“Most of us have a tendency both to overestimate the importance 
of dispositional qualities and to underestimate the importance of situational 
qualities when trying to understand the causes of other people’s behavior.”); 
Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 133, at 22 n.69 (“We are moved far more by forces 
that we do not appreciate than we realize and far less by forces to which we 
attribute behavior than we realize.”). 
137 See generally DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS WILL 
(2002); see also Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 133, at 124–33. 
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Though we perceive will and behave and experience ourselves 
“as if” our will were controlling our behavior, and though we 
project will onto the behavior of others, these intuitive 
conceptions of the will are fundamentally unreliable indicators 
of both the reality of our will and the source of our behavior.
138
 
Thus, even if the Justices subjectively experience their 
decision making as an attempt to reach the best reading of the 
Constitution, their own perceptions generally misapprehend 
what actually determines their behavior.  The Justices 
themselves can see only a part of what moves them.  Hence, no 
matter what they write in their opinions, or how much they 
might protest to the contrary,139 there is much more to their 
choices than the objective interpretation of law.  Forces external 
to the law and outside the Justices’ cognition influence their 
attraction to particular constitutional theories, frame their 
readings of history and tradition, and shade their interpretations 
of precedent. 
Furthermore, even assuming the Justices do no more than 
interpret and apply the law–acting as umpires calling balls and 
strikes, in Chief Justice Roberts’ famous analogy140–the Court’s 
decisions will inevitably depend on the composition of the 
Court’s personnel.  To state the obvious, different Justices, of 
equal intelligence and skill, interpreting the same legal texts, 
often reach quite different results.  This is because the 
conventional sources of constitutional law are generally 
indeterminate; they rarely compel a particular result, especially 
 
138 Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 133, at 131. 
139 For example, a day after one of the clearest examples in the Court’s history of 
the influence of politics on the justices’ decision making, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 
(2000), Justice Thomas told an audience that a Justice’s political affiliation had 
“[z]ero” role in shaping his decisions.  HOWARD GILLMAN, THE VOTES THAT 
COUNTED 172 (2001).  When asked later that day whether he agreed with Thomas’s 
comment, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, “[a]bsolutely, absolutely.”  Id. at 173 
(alteration in original).  And in January 2001, a month after Bush v. Gore, Justice 
Breyer asserted that it was the law that determined the Court’s decisions–“it isn’t 
ideology, and it isn’t politics.”  Id. 
140 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief 
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts) (“Judges are like umpires.  
Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them.  The role of an umpire and a judge 
is critical.  They make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited role.  
Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the umpire.”). 
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in cases that reach the Supreme Court.141  Consequently, a 
Justice’s constitutional ideology, worldview, and personal 
experiences affect the way she approaches the project of 
constitutional interpretation.142  Thus, an account of the Court’s 
decisions that fails to address the forces leading to the 
composition of its membership is, at best, incomplete.  Why was 
the Court staffed with these Justices, possessing these particular 
constitutional visions, at this particular moment in history? 
For all of these reasons, explanations of the Court’s decision 
making must account for the historical, political, and social 
context in which the Justices act.  Though the Court is certainly 
“independent” in important respects, its independence is 
constrained and shaped by the larger political system in which 
the Court is embedded and the various institutions with which 
the Court interacts.143  The point can be overstated, and it is 
often oversimplified, but Robert Dahl’s famous insight of more 
than fifty years ago remains largely valid: at least in a general 
sense, “the policy views dominant on the Court are never for 
long out of line with the policy views dominant among the 
lawmaking majorities of the United States.”144 
The mechanisms supporting this relationship are fairly 
straightforward.  First, the appointment process ensures that the 
Justices tend to reflect the constitutional ideologies of their 
appointing presidents and, to a lesser degree, those of their 
confirming senators.145  Presidents select nominees based largely 
on their perceived constitutional views, and senators cast their 
 
141 See Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term–Foreword: A 
Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 39–54 (2005). 
142 KLARMAN, supra note 124, at 447 (“Whether the traditional sources of 
constitutional law are thought to plainly forbid a particular practice depends on the 
personal values of the interpreter and on the social and political context.”). 
143 See generally THE SUPREME COURT & AMERICAN POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006); SUPREME COURT 
DECISION-MAKING (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999); THE 
SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS (Howard Gillman & Cornell Clayton 
eds., 1999). 
144 Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court As a 
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957). 
145 See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE 
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 132 (2005); TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN 
DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 100 (1999); Balkin & Levinson, supra note 9, at 
1066–70. 
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confirmation votes for much the same reason.146  Second, the 
Court’s institutional dependence requires the Justices to be 
sensitive to the political priorities of Congress, the President, the 
lower courts, and the general public, all of which have the 
capacity to frustrate the Court’s objectives.147  Without at least 
the tacit cooperation of these other power holders, the Court’s 
decisions are largely irrelevant.148  Finally, like all human beings, 
the Justices want to be admired and respected by friends, family, 
fellow judges, law professors, practicing lawyers, the media, the 
general public, and any number of other salient audiences.149  
This basic human need for approval tends to push the Justices 
toward results that are consistent with prevailing political 
sentiments.150 
Together, these mechanisms generally ensure that the Court 
operates within, rather than outside, the nation’s political 
currents.  That is, “the justices typically act in a way that is 
broadly consistent with the preferences of a dominant political 
coalition and, conversely,... they rarely adopt a course of action 
that is opposed by that coalition.”151 
 
146 See PERETTI, supra note 145, at 84–101. 
147 See id. at 133–51; Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. 
REV. 257, 295–329 (2005). 
148 To cite just one example, the Court in 1954 held in Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), that racial segregation in public education was 
unconstitutional.  But eleven years later, ninety-nine percent of African-American 
children in the Deep South were still attending schools that were completely 
segregated.  GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 50 tbl.2.1 (1991).  It 
was not until Congress enacted major civil rights legislation, and the Justice 
Department began suing school districts for noncompliance, that meaningful 
desegregation started to occur.  See id. at 42–57.  Or consider the Court’s more 
recent decision in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000), 
in which the Justices held that a public high school’s policy of permitting student-led 
prayers before football games violated the Establishment Clause.  Two months 
later, thousands of people were openly praying at high school football games 
throughout the South, some in a manner that was probably permissible under the 
letter (but not the spirit) of the Court’s ruling, some in open defiance.  See David 
Firestone, South’s Football Fans Still Stand Up and Pray, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 
2000, at 1A. 
149 See LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES (2006). 
150 See Bradley W. Joondeph, Judging and Self-Presentation: Towards a More 
Realistic Conception of the Human (Judicial) Animal, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
523 (2008). 
151 Howard Gillman, De-Lochnerizing Lochner, 85 B.U. L. REV. 859, 864 (2005). 
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Of course, the point should not be overstated.152  As Howard 
Gillman has explained, the evolution of constitutional law 
“never quite works out as a simple story of judges merely acting 
as faithful ‘agents’ in service of their ‘principals.’”153  The Court 
does not march in lockstep with any political coalition or 
partisan agenda, and constitutional law often evolves in 
haphazard ways.  As Thomas Keck has pointed out, 
“constitutional development does not in fact proceed by means 
of the smooth, wholesale replacement of an existing 
constitutional order with an emergent one,” but instead usually 
occurs “by means of a slow, halting transition.”154 
One reason is that, once on the bench, Justices may embrace 
constitutional views that differ from those that the appointing 
president and his political coalition had expected at the time of 
appointment.155  Another is that the governing regime is often 
fractured, either because Congress and the presidency are held 
by different political parties or because the majority party, 
though controlling both elected branches, is split internally.  
Such situations typically afford the Court a fair degree of 
political support for any resolution of a given constitutional 
dispute (and ensure that it will not confront a dangerously united 
opposition).156  Moreover, most of the cases that the Court 
decides are not politically salient, such that elected officials 
generally do not care how the issues are resolved.157  Finally, 
 
152 See generally Thomas M. Keck, Party Politics or Judicial Independence? The 
Regime Politics Literature Hits the Law Schools, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 511 
(2007). 
153 Howard Gillman, Party Politics and Constitutional Change: The Political 
Origins of Liberal Judicial Activism, in THE SUPREME COURT & AMERICAN 
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 141 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006). 
154 THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY 4 
(2004). 
155 See Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, 
When, and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483 (2007). 
156 See Keck, supra note 152, at 517 (“[T]he governing coalition is so often 
divided on important matters that the justices will have multiple acceptable 
alternatives in most cases.”); Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court and the National 
Political Order: Collaboration and Confrontation, in THE SUPREME COURT AND 
AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 117, 131 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch 
eds., 2006). 
157 See Howard Gillman, Judicial Independence Through the Lens of Bush v. 
Gore: Four Lessons from Political Science, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 254 (2003) 
(“[M]ost of what courts do (especially lower courts) is of little or no interest to 
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election results do not automatically translate into legal change.  
As Steven Teles has explained, various social institutions, such 
“professional associations, the politically motivated parts of the 
bar, and law schools” all can play a significant role in the 
evolution of the law.158  Specifically, “groups with 
disproportionate control of the institutions that produce and 
legitimate legal ideas, groups who have legal ‘authority,’ will 
enjoy a significant advantage in persuading judges and other 
significant legal actors that their demands are reasonable and 
appropriate.”159  Thus, effecting legal change can require the 
“nonelectorial mobilization” of powerful elites, a mobilization 
that might be “only weakly coupled with the cycles of electoral 
politics.”160 
As a consequence, the Court often enjoys a fairly broad 
expanse in which to act autonomously, especially in cases of low 
political salience, and it frequently reaches results that, in an 
immediate sense, contravene public opinion and the views of the 
ascendant political coalition.161  But one should not miss the 
forest for the trees.  As a wealth of empirical research has 
demonstrated, the Court’s jurisprudence, at least in its broad 
contours, tends to reflect the constitutional values of the political 
movement that has empowered and sustained it, as well as the 
social and cultural values of the institutions that surround it.162  
 
policy-makers (beyond a general interest in relatively efficient case processing), 
which means that deference to courts is normally a byproduct of the overall political 
banality of the judiciary’s work, rather than its sensitivity or salience.”). 
158 STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT 11 
(2008). 
159 Id. at 12. 
160 Id. at 12, 14. 
161 See Howard Gillman, The Court As an Idea, Not a Building (or a Game): 
Interpretive Institutionalism and the Analysis of Supreme Court Decision-Making, in 
SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING, supra note 143, at 65, 70 (“[W]hile there are 
some notorious examples of the Court retreating in the face of external pressure 
from other powerholders, there is still reason to believe that the justices are not 
particularly concerned with the possibility that their decisions might be overturned 
or that their jobs might be in jeopardy . . . .”); Keck, supra note 152, at 533 (“In 
most cases that reach the Supreme Court, every conceivable decision would be 
supported by some powerful political actor, and we could always then conclude that 
the decision happened because that actor demanded it.”). 
162 See Pickerill & Clayton, supra note 9, at 236 (“A large body of empirical 
research in political science and history now exists to support the claim made more 
than a century ago by Finley Peter Dunne’s fictional bartender-philosopher, Mr. 
JOONDEPH.FMT 12/8/2008  10:58:27 AM 
2008] Federalism, the Rehnquist Court, and the Modern Republican Party 157 
To oversimplify a bit, the Taney Court’s jurisprudence, and 
particularly its decision in Dred Scott,163 was an extension of the 
values animating the Jacksonian political regime that had 
dominated American politics since the 1820s.164  The Supreme 
Court of the late 1930s and 1940s effectively cemented the 
central priorities of FDR’s New Deal coalition into 
constitutional doctrine, particularly in its federalism and Due 
Process Clause decisions, which essentially eliminated the 
judiciary’s role in reviewing the propriety of economic 
regulation.165  The Warren Court’s decisions of the 1960s in the 
areas of racial discrimination, civil liberties, voting rights, and 
criminal procedure, to cite another example, generally reflected 
the consensus of political elites during the Great Society, a 
coalition composed of non-Southern Democrats and liberal 
Republicans.166  In each case, the Court functioned more as a 
policy-making partner of the elected branches than as an 
independent check on them. 
In many respects, then, the Supreme Court’s “decisions are 
influenced by specific patterns of party politics, partisan 
electoral realignments, and control of national electoral 
institutions,” such that “even when the justices adhere to 
‘principled’ jurisprudence and follow constitutional norms, the 
meaning of such principles will, over time, reflect changes in the 
substantive values of the national political regime.”167  Of course, 
the Court’s decision making is not only about politics.  But it is 
always about politics, at least in important ways, and keeping 
this in mind might shed some light on the apparent tensions 
 
Dooley, who quipped: ‘. . . th’ supreme coort follows th’ iliction returns.’” (quoting 
FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY’S OPINIONS 26 (1901)). 
163 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
164 See Mark A. Graber, Popular Constitutionalism, Judicial Supremacy, and the 
Complete Lincoln-Douglas Debates, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 923 (2006). 
165 See Tushnet, supra note 156, at 118–19. 
166 See generally LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN 
POLITICS (2000); Gillman, supra note 153, at 145–58; Tushnet, supra note 156, at 
121–24. 
167 Pickerill & Clayton, supra note 9, at 236; see also JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST 
DEMOCRATIC BRANCH 185 (2006) (“[T]he Supreme Court has followed the 
public’s views about constitutional questions throughout its history, and, on the rare 
occasions that it has been even modestly out of line with popular majorities, it has 
gotten into trouble.”); Richard Primus, Bolling Alone, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 
1021–25 (2004). 
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concerning state autonomy in the Rehnquist Court’s federalism 
decisions. 
B.  Federalism and the Modern Republican Party 
Again, the political movement that empowered the Rehnquist 
Court was the post-Watergate Republican Party, which 
appointed or promoted seven of its members.168  It is well known 
that, beginning with the presidency of Ronald Reagan, the 
national GOP has generally embraced the goal of devolving 
greater authority to state and local governments.169  As Reagan 
stated in his first inaugural address, he intended as president 
to curb the size and influence of the Federal establishment and 
to demand recognition of the distinction between the powers 
granted to the Federal Government and those reserved to the 
States or to the people.  All of us need to be reminded that the 
Federal Government did not create the States; the States 
created the Federal Government.
170
 
In 1987, Reagan issued Executive Order 12,612, which sought to 
“restore the division of governmental responsibilities between 
the national government and the States that was intended by the 
Framers of the Constitution.”171  The order required all 
executive branch departments and agencies to formulate and 
implement policy in a manner consistent with nine “fundamental 
federalism principles.”172  Among those principles were the 
admonitions that “[i]n most areas of governmental concern, the 
States uniquely possess the constitutional authority, the 
resources, and the competence to discern the sentiments of the 
people and to govern accordingly” and that “[i]n the absence of 
 
168 President Ford appointed John Paul Stevens.  President Reagan appointed 
Sandra Day O’Connor, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy, and he elevated 
William Rehnquist from associate to chief justice.  President George H.W. Bush 
appointed David Souter and Clarence Thomas.  See LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. 
SEGAL, HAROLD J. SPAETH & THOMAS G. WALKER, THE SUPREME COURT 
COMPENDIUM 254 tbl.4-1 (3d ed. 2003). 
169 See Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on 
Congressional Power: Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L.J. 
363, 383–99 (2003). 
170 Inaugural Address, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1, 2 (Jan. 20, 1981). 
171 Exec. Order No. 12,612, 3 C.F.R. 252, 252–53 (1987), revoked by Exec. Order 
No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206, 211 (1999), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2008). 
172 Id. at 253–54. 
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clear constitutional or statutory authority, the presumption of 
sovereignty should rest with the individual States.”173 
Post-Watergate national GOP party platforms have likewise 
endorsed shifting greater authority from the federal government 
to the states.  The 1980 platform, for example, stated that the 
“Republican Party reaffirms its belief in the decentralization of 
the federal government and in the traditional American 
principle that the best government is the one closest to the 
people,” where “it is less costly, more accountable, and more 
responsive to people’s needs.”174  In 1988, the GOP “reassert[ed] 
adherence to the Tenth Amendment, reserving to the States and 
to the people all powers not expressly delegated to the national 
government.”175  The 1992 platform emphasized “the crucial 
importance of the Tenth Amendment” and pledged that the 
party would “not initiate any federal activity that can be 
conducted better on the State or local level.”176  And the 2000 
platform proclaimed that the leadership of Republican state 
governors had strengthened the party’s “commitment to restore 
the force of the Tenth Amendment, the best protection the 
American people have against federal intrusion and bullying.”177 
More important for present purposes, the belief that the 
federal judiciary should enforce the federalism-based limits on 
Congress’s enumerated powers has become a sort of modern 
Republican orthodoxy.  As a study by J. Mitchell Pickerill and 
Cornell W. Clayton concluded, by the 1980s Republicans had 
“clearly incorporated the courts and constitutional law into their 
strategy for reining in federal power and addressing the balance 
of power between state and federal government.”178  As just one 
indication, consider an influential document issued by the Justice 
 
173 Id. 
174 REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVENTION, REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM OF 1980 
(1980), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25844. 
175 REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVENTION, REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM OF 1988 
(1988), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25846. 
176 REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVENTION, REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM OF 1992 
(1992), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25847. 
177 REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVENTION, REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM OF 2000 
(2000), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25849. 
178 Pickerill & Clayton, supra note 9, at 238; see also id. (stating that, by the 1980s, 
Republicans “clearly began to focus on the role of courts, judges, and constitutional 
law as a key” to protecting state sovereignty). 
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Department’s Office of Legal Policy in 1988, Guidelines on 
Constitutional Litigation,179 a sort of field guide for government 
lawyers.  Among other things, the Guidelines suggested that the 
basic rationale of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority180–that “State sovereign interests... are more properly 
protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of 
the federal system than by judicially created limitations on 
federal power”181–was wrong.182  The document instructed 
government attorneys to use various passages from Justice 
Powell’s Garcia dissent “as a basis for arguing, in appropriate 
cases, for judicial protection of state sovereignty.”183  Further, it 
contended that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Perez v. United 
States184 and Wickard v. Filburn,185 both of which adopted 
expansive interpretations of the commerce power, and 
Katzenbach v. Morgan,186 which indicated that Congress, in using 
its enforcement powers, could interpret the Reconstruction 
Amendments’ substantive protections more broadly than the 
Court, had been incorrectly decided and should not form the 
basis for arguments presented by the United States in 
litigation.187 
Or consider again the GOP’s national platforms.  The 1980 
platform committed the party to appointing judges “whose 
judicial philosophy... is consistent with the belief in the 
decentralization of the federal government and efforts to return 
decisionmaking power to state and local elected officials.”188  
The 1988 platform argued that federal “judicial power must be 
exercised with deference toward State and local authority; it 
must not expand at the expense of our representative 
institutions.”189  And the 1996 platform was more emphatic still: 
 
179 OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDELINES ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION (1988). 
180 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
181 Id. at 552. 
182 See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 179, at 54–56. 
183 Id. at 55. 
184 402 U.S. 146 (1971). 
185 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
186 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
187 OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 179, at 52–54, 59. 
188 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM OF 1980, supra note 174. 
189 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM OF 1988, supra note 175. 
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“For more than half a century, [the Tenth Amendment] has 
been scorned by liberal Democrats and the judicial activism of 
the judges they have appointed.  We will restore the force of the 
Tenth Amendment and, in the process, renew the trust and 
respect which hold together a free society.”190  Thus, as Pickerill 
and Clayton concluded, “the Republicans explicitly linked their 
stronger philosophical version of federalism with a judicial 
agenda, advocating the judicial-safeguards approach.”191 
Of course, another central commitment of the modern GOP–
perhaps the central commitment of the modern GOP–has been 
to reduce the level and stringency of government regulation on 
private business activity.  As Reagan famously stated, also in his 
first inaugural (and before the passage addressing federalism), 
“government is not the solution to our problem; government is 
the problem.”192  From antitrust enforcement to labor and 
employment issues to consumer safety to environmental 
protection, a centerpiece of modern Republican philosophy has 
been a belief in free markets–a conviction that private ordering 
tends better to serve social welfare than government regulation. 
What, then, has happened when these core GOP 
commitments have collided?  How have Republicans prioritized 
their distinct policy goals of devolving greater power to the 
states and reducing economic regulation?  To be sure, 
Republican views on the subject have not been uniform.  The 
balance of evidence nonetheless suggests that the substantive 
goal of reducing economic regulation has been more important 
to the national GOP than the more abstract, procedural goal of 
devolving greater power to the states. 
First, consider the Contract with America, one of the defining 
documents of the modern conservative movement.193  Led by 
 
190 REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVENTION, REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM OF 1996 
(1996), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25848. 
191 Pickerill & Clayton, supra note 9, at 242; see also Gillman, supra note 153, at 
159 (noting that “one of the explicit goals of the Reagan Justice Department was to 
use judicial appointments, not simply to reverse some of the more unwelcome 
features of the modern judicial liberalism, but also to institutionalize key features of 
the political agenda of the New Right, including a rollback of the scope of federal 
power over commerce and civil rights and an expansion of the idea of state 
sovereignty”). 
192 Inaugural Address, supra note 170, at 1. 
193 REPUBLICAN CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, http://www.house.gov/house/ 
Contract/CONTRACT.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2008). 
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Representative Newt Gingrich, a team of House Republican 
leaders drafted the Contract six weeks in advance of the 1994 
midterm elections.194  More than 300 Republican House 
candidates signed the Contract, and it effectively became the 
platform for the GOP’s national campaign.195  The heart of the 
Contract was a pledge to bring ten bills to the House floor in the 
first 100 days of the 104th Congress.196  Tellingly, none of the 
proposed bills would have enhanced the policy-making 
autonomy of state governments, save the “effective death 
penalty provisions” in the proposed “Taking Back Our Streets 
Act,”197 which sought to limit the power of federal courts to 
grant habeas corpus relief to state prisoners.198  But the ninth 
listed bill, “The Common Sense Legal Reform Act,”199 proposed 
fairly significant changes to the tort system that would have 
displaced large swaths of state law, mandating “‘[l]oser pays’ 
laws, reasonable limits on punitive damages and reform of 
product liability laws to stem the endless tide of litigation.”200  
Following the 1994 election, these proposals materialized in the 
Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996,201 
which passed both houses of Congress before being vetoed by 
President Clinton.202  The Act would have covered “any product 
liability action brought in any State or Federal court,” and it 
would have heightened the requirements for establishing a 
defendant’s liability, provided for additional affirmative 
defenses, limited the availability of punitive damages, and 
restricted the awarding of noneconomic damages.203 
 
194 See David E. Rosenbaum, Republicans Offer Voters a Deal for Takeover of 
House, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1994, at A16. 
195 See Katharine Q. Seelye, Files Show How Gingrich Laid a Grand G.O.P. 
Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1995, at A1. 
196 See REPUBLICAN CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, supra note 193. 
197 Id. 
198 See Taking Back Our Streets Act of 1995, H.R. 3, 104th Cong. §§ 101–104 
(1995). 
199 REPUBLICAN CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, supra note 193. 
200 Id. 
201 H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (1996). 
202 See Neil A. Lewis, President Vetoes Limits on Liability, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 
1996, at A1. 
203 H.R. 956, §§ 102(a)(1), 103–111. 
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Or consider once more the GOP’s recent platforms.  Since 
1980, Republicans have consistently called for significant 
changes to the nation’s legal system, particularly with respect to 
tort litigation, reforms that would override state policies on 
matters that have traditionally been reserved to state 
governments.  For example, GOP platforms have regularly taken 
aim at punitive damage awards.  In 1992, Republicans pledged to 
“restore fairness and predictability to punitive damages by 
placing appropriate limits on them, dividing trials into two 
phases to determine liability separately from damages, and 
requiring clear proof of wrongdoing.”204  Republicans have also 
called for federal legislation governing products liability.  For 
instance, the 1996 platform argued that the absence of a federal 
products liability law “not only penalizes consumers with higher 
costs and keeps needed products off the market, but also gives 
foreign nations a competitive edge over American workers.”205  
The 2000 platform also stated that “[a]n integral part of legal 
reform is a federal product liability law.  Without it, consumers 
face higher costs, needed products don’t make it to the market, 
and American jobs are lost to foreign competitors.”206  
Moreover, every GOP platform since 1988 has endorsed changes 
in the medical malpractice system that would reduce the liability 
of health care providers, including “reasonable caps on non-
economic awards.”207 
Unsurprisingly, these policy ideas have surfaced in hundreds 
of Republican-sponsored bills introduced in Congress.  Time and 
again, Republican legislators have pushed laws seeking to 
displace state tort law by limiting the availability of punitive 
damages, restricting the amount of noneconomic damages that 
could be awarded (particularly in medical malpractice cases), 
providing defendants with additional safe harbors from liability, 
increasing the requirements for establishing liability in the first 
instance, and forcing plaintiffs to bear the defendant’s legal costs 
 
204 REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVENTION, REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM OF 
1992, supra note 176. 
205 REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVENTION, REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM OF 
1996, supra note 190. 
206 REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVENTION, REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM OF 
2000, supra note 177. 
207 REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVENTION, REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM OF 2004 
(2004), available at http://www .presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25850. 
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in unsuccessful lawsuits.208  For example, the Product Liability 
Reform Act of 1997,209 which would have governed “any product 
liability action brought in any State or Federal court;”210 imposed 
national (and generally stricter) liability rules;211 created “a 
complete defense” to such actions when “the claimant was 
intoxicated or was under the influence of intoxicating alcohol or 
any drug when the accident” occurred;212 created a national, two-
year statute of limitations;213 prohibited the award of punitive 
damages except when “the claimant establishes by clear and 
convincing evidence” that the defendant acted “with a conscious, 
flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of others”;214 limited 
the size of most punitive damage awards to $250,000;215 
bifurcated the proceedings for determining compensatory and 
punitive damages;216 and mandated that liability for 
noneconomic damages among multiple defendants would be 
several, but not joint.217  Likewise, the Medical Injury 
Compensation Reform Act of 1995218 would have imposed a 
uniform two-year statute of limitations on medical malpractice 
claims,219 limited the contingency fees that lawyers could charge 
plaintiffs in malpractice cases,220 and prohibited any punitive 
damages award exceeding $250,000,221 and it would have applied 
 
208 See, e.g., Innocent Sellers Fairness Act, H.R. 989, 110th Cong. (2007); Small 
Business Liability Reform Act of 2003, H.R. 2813, 108th Cong. (2003); Small 
Business Liability Reform Act of 2003, S. 1546, 108th Cong. (2003); Small Business 
Liability Reform Act of 2001, H.R. 1805, 107th Cong. (2001); Small Business 
Liability Reform Act of 2001, S. 865, 107th Cong. (2001); Small Business Liability 
Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 2366, 106th Cong. (1999); Product Liability Reform Act 
of 1997, S. 5, 105th Cong. (1997); Product Liability Fairness Act of 1995, S. 565, 
104th Cong. (1995); Common Sense Product Liability Reform Act, H.R. 917, 104th 
Cong. (1995). 
209 S. 5, 105th Cong. (1997). 
210 Id. § 102(a)(1). 
211 Id. § 103(a). 
212 Id. § 104(a), (a)(1). 
213 Id. § 106(a). 
214 Id. § 108(a). 
215 Id. § 108(b)(1). 
216 Id. § 108(c). 
217 Id. § 110(a). 
218 H.R. 229, 104th Cong. (1995). 
219 Id. § 5(a). 
220 Id. § 6(a). 
221 Id. § 7(a). 
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to any malpractice action “brought in a State or Federal court 
against a health care provider or health care professional.”222 
Almost all of these legislative efforts have been unsuccessful.  
But Republicans were able to enact the Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005,223 which places limits on the recovery of plaintiffs’ 
attorneys’ fees224 and makes it easier for defendants to remove 
class actions to federal court, where businesses are more apt to 
obtain summary judgments.225 
Federal GOP legislators have also sought to displace state law 
in a more limited and targeted fashion through the inclusion of 
various express preemption provisions in scores of Republican-
sponsored bills.  Consider these recently enacted laws, all passed 
when Republicans controlled the House, the Senate, and the 
White House: the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 
for 2006 preempts all state tort law with respect to injuries from 
certain drugs and vaccines;226 the Protection of Lawful 
Commerce in Arms Act preempts most civil actions brought 
under state law against firearms and ammunition dealers or 
manufacturers;227 the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act 
of 2003 preempts a number of state credit reporting and identity 
theft laws;228 and the Energy Policy Act of 2005 preempts a 
number of stricter state energy efficiency standards for a variety 
of consumer appliances.229  According to a report prepared by 
the minority staff of the House Committee on Government 
Reform for Democratic Representative Henry Waxman, the 
Republican-controlled House and Senate “voted 57 times to 
preempt state laws and regulations” between 2001 and 2006, 
 
222 Id. § 3(6); see also id. § 10(a) (expressly preempting state statutes of limitation 
and greater recovery amounts). 
223 Pub. L. No. 109–2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1711–1715 (2008)). 
224 See id. § 3, 119 Stat. at 6. 
225 See id. § 5, 119 Stat. at 12–13; see also Editorial, A Dismal Class-Action Finale, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2005, at A16. 
226 See Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, Pub. L. No. 109–148, 
119 Stat. 2818, 2821 (2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d (2008)). 
227 See Pub. L. No. 109–92, § 3, 119 Stat. 2095, 2096–97 (2005) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903 (2008)). 
228 See Pub. L. No. 108–159, 117 Stat. 1952, 1961–64, 1972–73 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681t (2008)). 
229 See Pub. L. No. 109–58, § 135, 119 Stat. 594, 624–34 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 6295, 6297 (2008)). 
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“result[ing] in 27 laws, signed by the President, that preempt 
state authority.”230 
Moreover, when federal statutes have been ambiguous, 
executive departments and agencies in the current Bush 
administration have attempted on a number of occasions to 
effect preemption through agency rulemaking.231  To cite just 
two examples, in March 2006 the Consumer Products Safety 
Commission promulgated a new rule governing mattress 
flammability, the preamble of which states that the Commission 
“intends and expects that the new mattress flammability 
standard will preempt inconsistent state standards and 
requirements, whether in the form of positive enactments or 
court created requirements.”232  This was the first time in the 
Commission’s history that it expressed such an intention.233  And 
in January 2006, the Food and Drug Administration issued a 
new rule concerning the labeling of prescription drugs and 
biological products, in which it asserted that “FDA approval of 
labeling... preempts conflicting or contrary State law.”234  As 
Catherine Sharkey noted, agencies have previously been “more 
reticent about including forceful preemptive statements in their 
regulations,” making these recent assertions a sort of “sea 
change in agency action.”235 
Finally, consider the arguments that Republican-led Justice 
Departments have presented to the Supreme Court in 
preemption cases since Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980.  
Between October 1981 and July 2007, the Supreme Court 
handed down opinions in 102 preemption cases where, at the 
time of briefing, the Solicitor General was a Republican 
 
230 MINORITY STAFF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIV. U.S. H.R. COMM. ON 
GOV’T REFORM, 109TH CONG., CONGRESSIONAL PREEMPTION OF STATE LAWS 
AND REGULATIONS 1 (2006), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/ 
20060606095331-23055.pdf. 
231 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the 
Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227 (2007). 
232 Final Rule: Standard for the Flammability (Open Flame) of Mattress Sets, 71 
Fed. Reg. 13,472, 13,496 (Mar. 15, 2006) (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 1633 (2008)). 
233 See Stephen Labaton, ‘Silent Tort Reform’ Is Overriding States’ Powers, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2006, at C5. 
234 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription 
Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (codified at 
21 C.F.R. §§ 201, 314, 601 (2008)). 
235 Sharkey, supra note 231, at 242. 
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appointee.236  The United States participated in sixty-two of 
those cases, five as a party and fifty-seven as amicus curiae.  In 
forty of these sixty-two cases, the Solicitor General argued that 
the state law at issue was completely preempted, and in four 
additional cases the United States argued that the state law was 
preempted in part.237  Moreover, in all four of the preemption 
cases in which the United States participated during the 2007 
October Term, Solicitor General Paul Clement contended that 
state law was preempted.238  All told, then, Republican Solicitors 
General have argued in favor of complete or partial preemption 
in more than seventy percent of the cases in which the United 
States has participated since October 1981.239 
Again, the point should not be overstated.  By no means has 
Republican opinion on these questions been monolithic.  
According to Charles Fried, Reagan’s Solicitor General from 
1985 to 1989, there were vigorous debates within the Justice 
Department concerning the government’s position on 
preemption, especially between Fried and more ideologically 
committed conservatives such as Charles Cooper and William 
Bradford Reynolds.240  And the ideological conservatives 
sometimes prevailed.  Consider Reagan’s Executive Order 
12,612, discussed above.  Section 4 of that order stated that 
“Executive departments and agencies shall construe... a Federal 
statute to preempt State law only when the statute contains an 
express preemption provision or there is some other firm and 
palpable evidence compelling the conclusion that the Congress 
intended preemption of State law.”241  Or consider again the 
Guidelines on Constitutional Litigation (“Guidelines”) issued in 
 
236 The data set used to compile these figures is available at http://claranet 
.scu.edu/coursepage.asp?cid=2086&page=01 (last visited Oct. 4, 2008). 
237 See id. 
238 Those cases were Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008), 
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 128 S. Ct. 1168 (2008) (mem.), Rowe v. N.H. Motor 
Transport Ass’n, 128 S. Ct. 989 (2008), and Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 
(2008).  The briefs filed by the Solicitor General in each case are available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2007/3mer/1ami/toc3index.html (last visited Oct. 4, 
2008). 
239 These figures come from the data set described supra note 236. 
240 See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN 
REVOLUTION–A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 35, 186–88 (1991). 
241 Exec. Order 12,612, 3 C.F.R. 252, 255 (1987), revoked by Exec. Order No. 
13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (1999), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2008). 
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1988 by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Policy under 
the direction of Attorney General Edwin Meese.  The 
Guidelines contended that Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,242 which 
held that state laws imposing burdens on interstate commerce 
that are clearly excessive in relation to their putative benefits 
violate the dormant Commerce Clause,243 was wrongly 
decided.244  Specifically, Pike is “not easily supported by the text 
of the commerce clause itself, nor necessitated by the purpose of 
the clause,” and it “raises important questions regarding federal 
invasion of powers reserved to the states under the Tenth 
Amendment.”245  A separate 1988 document prepared by Office 
of Legal Policy, The Constitution in the Year 2000, stated that 
“the Court has weakened state authority by giving a wide scope 
to federal preemption,” noting that the Court had “invalidated 
state laws that did not explicitly conflict with federal laws by 
presuming or inferring a congressional intent to fully occupy a 
given field of regulation.”246  For the future, the Office of Legal 
Policy suggested that “the Court could refuse to find 
Congressional occupation of a regulatory field absent either 
clear Congressional intent to displace the states or an actual 
conflict with state law.”247 
Thus, influential voices in the GOP have plainly pushed for a 
more robust vision of state autonomy, even when it might result 
in more stringent state-level economic regulation.  But on 
balance, the post-Watergate Republican Party as a whole 
appears generally to have been unconcerned about intrusions on 
state policy-making autonomy when those intrusions furthered 
the goal of reducing the level of regulation on private enterprise.  
And in the main, this was the balance struck by the Rehnquist 
Court.  In their preemption and dormant Commerce Clause 
decisions, the Justices tended to find the cause of protecting 
state prerogatives less compelling than the need for consistent, 
uniform, and less stringent economic regulation. 
 
242 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
243 Id. at 142. 
244 OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 179, at 53. 
245 Id. 
246 OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE CONSTITUTION IN 
THE YEAR 2000 135 (1988). 
247 Id. at 139. 
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CONCLUSION 
Empirical analysis of the Rehnquist Court’s federalism 
decisions reveals that the Justices’ approach to state autonomy 
was more complicated than many have assumed.  In cases 
involving the federalism-based limits on Congress’s enumerated 
powers, Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas 
consistently voted for outcomes that promoted state 
governmental authority.  But in preemption and dormant 
Commerce Clause cases, the same five Justices tended to 
support results that diminished the states’ capacity to set their 
own policy agendas. 
Several commentators have argued that these differing 
attitudes toward state autonomy were inconsistent or even 
hypocritical,248 and perhaps by some measures they were.  But as 
a historical or political matter, this apparent tension in the 
Rehnquist Court’s federalism jurisprudence is quite 
understandable if not fully predictable.  Though the Court’s 
concern for state autonomy may have varied by context, the 
broad arc of its decisions reflected the priorities of national 
political coalition that empowered and sustained most of the 
Justices.  Reinvigorating federalism’s constraints on the national 
government, while simultaneously reducing the level of 
regulation on private businesses, appears to have been the policy 
path that the majority of national Republican officials preferred.  
The Justices of the Rehnquist Court crafted constitutional 
doctrines that generally facilitated these objectives. 
In this sense, the Rehnquist Court’s federalism decisions 
largely mimicked the Court’s broader political dynamic.249  As 
Mark Tushnet and Thomas Keck have observed, under 
Rehnquist’s leadership the Court was quite successful in 
transforming the law on matters over which its more traditional, 
pragmatic conservatives (O’Connor and Kennedy) and its more 
ideological, movement conservatives (Thomas, Scalia, and to 
some degree Rehnquist) could agree, such as criminal procedure 
 
248 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 1318 (“The Supreme Court’s recent 
preemption decisions are striking because they are so at odds with the Court’s 
insistence on deference to the states in Commerce Clause and state sovereign 
immunity cases.”). 
249 See generally KECK, supra note 154; TUSHNET, supra note 9. 
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and school desegregation.250  But on several other issues, such as 
gay rights, abortion, and affirmative action, the conservative 
majority fractured, with the views held by the traditional 
Republicans, in team with the Court’s more liberal Justices, 
prevailing.251 
Federalism, broadly defined, seems to have followed a similar 
pattern.  Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas 
were remarkably united in their drive to reinvigorate the 
structural constraints on Congress, and that unity produced the 
federalism offensive for which the Rehnquist Court is known.  
But with respect to the federalism-based limits on state 
governments, the views of those more ideologically committed 
to state autonomy–reflected, for instance, in the desires of 
Scalia and Thomas to inter the dormant Commerce Clause–
never took root.  Instead, it was the position held by the Court’s 
more moderate, establishment Republicans, and not 
coincidentally the ideological center of the national GOP, that 
was ultimately reflected in the Court’s decisions. 
Perhaps the Roberts Court will take federalism in different 
directions.  Both John Roberts and Samuel Alito served as 
political appointees in Ronald Reagan’s Justice Department, and 
they may well prove more ideologically committed to the 
principle of robust state autonomy than their predecessors.  But 
if such a turn in the Court’s jurisprudence occurs, it will be 
something new.  It will not be a legacy of the Rehnquist Court. 
 
250 See KECK, supra note 154, at 279–83; TUSHNET, supra note 9. 
251 See KECK, supra note 154, at 279–83; TUSHNET, supra note 9. 
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APPENDIX 
The following lists all of the cases included in the empirical 
study, sorted by subject matter and presented in reverse 
chronological order. 
DECISIONS ADDRESSING THE LIMITS ON CONGRESS’S 
ENUMERATED POWERS 
Commerce Clause 
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) 
Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129 (2003) 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) 
Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) 
Tenth Amendment 
Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) 
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) 
Spending Clause 
Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004) 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) 
Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) 
Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 
(2002) 
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) 
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) 
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) 
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense 
Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) 
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. 
Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) 
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) 
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Eleventh Amendment 
Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004) 
Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004) 
Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 
613 (2002) 
Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533 (2002) 
California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491 (1998) 
Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425 (1997) 
Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994) 
P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 
U.S. 139 (1993) 
 
DECISIONS ADDRESSING THE FEDERALISM-BASED LIMITS ON 
STATE GOVERNMENTS 
Preemption 
Mid-Con Freight Sys., Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 
U.S. 440 (2005) 
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005) 
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004) 
Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 
U.S. 246 (2004) 
Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004) 
Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) 
Entergy La., Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 539 U.S. 39 (2003) 
Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003) 
Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 
(2003) 
Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003) 
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002) 
City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecking Serv., Inc., 536 
U.S. 424 (2002) 
Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002) 
Wis. Dep’t of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473 
(2002) 
Chao v. Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc., 534 U.S. 235 (2002) 
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) 
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Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141 (2001) 
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001) 
Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) 
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) 
Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (2000) 
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) 
Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999) 
El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 
(1999) 
Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67 (1997) 
Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911 (1997) 
Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997) 
De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 
U.S. 806 (1997) 
Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham 
Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316 (1997) 
Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213 (1997) 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) 
Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996) 
Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) 
Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 
(1996) 
Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996) 
Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749 (1995) 
N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995) 
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995) 
Anderson v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 143 (1995) 
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) 
Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995) 
Neb. Dep’t of Revenue v. Loewenstein, 513 U.S. 123 (1994) 
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246 (1994) 
Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994) 
Dep’t of Taxation and Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc., 512 
U.S. 61 (1994) 
Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443 (1994) 
Dep’t of Revenue v. ACF Indus., Inc., 510 U.S. 332 (1994) 
U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491 (1993) 
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CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993) 
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Assoc. Builders & 
Contractors, 507 U.S. 218 (1993) 
Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60 (1993) 
District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 
125 (1992) 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) 
Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992) 
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992) 
Dormant Commerce Clause 
Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 
429 (2005) 
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) 
Hillside Dairy Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59 (2003) 
Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 
(2003) 
Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 528 U.S. 458 (2000) 
S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160 (1999) 
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 
U.S. 564 (1997) 
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997) 
Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996) 
Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749 (1995) 
Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 
(1995) 
Barclays Bank PLC v. Francise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994) 
W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994) 
Associated Indus. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641 (1994) 
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 
(1994) 
Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 
(1994) 
Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, 510 U.S. 355 (1994) 
Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60 (1993) 
Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue & Fin., 505 
U.S. 71 (1992) 
Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768 
(1992) 
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Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Natural 
Res., 504 U.S. 353 (1992) 
Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992) 
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) 
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992) 
 
 
